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DYNAMIC PATENT GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE
AND THE UNITED STATES: THE MYRIAD EXAMPLE
Kali Murray* and Esther van Zimmeren**
ABSTRACT

This Article examines the emerging elements of a new
model for patent governance. It is divided into four parts. In
Section One, we develop a model of dynamic patent governance.
This model extends the theoretical framework of network
governance, to explain the emergence of networks in the decisionmaking infrastructure for the public and private actors in the patent
system. Dynamic patent governance widens this theoretical
framework in two key ways. First, dynamic patent governance,
within its formal dimensions, is based on the idea that
heterogeneous administrative actors regulate the grant and
enforcement of patents. This challenges a perspective that sees
patent examination agencies as the sole actor of importance within
the patent system. Second, dynamic patent governance, within its
informal dimensions, highlights that the patent administrative
regime is shaped by the fluid relationship of diverse actors to these
heterogeneous administrative actors. Section Two explores the
consequences of a more dynamic patent governance context.
Section Three applies this model to explore the recent Myriad
litigation in the United States and Europe. Section Four focuses on
some particular challenges that dynamic patent governance poses
to: (1) the impulse to centralize patent administration and litigation;
and (2) the efficiency of the patent system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It started out in a typical manner. On August 12, 1994, a patent
application was filed in the United States Patent Office (USPTO) that
claimed as its primary invention, a DNA 1 isolated sequence for what
* Kali Murray, Assistant Professor, Marquette University Law School. Equal contribution
by each author. I would like to thank Ernest “Dutch” Igoni for his support this year. I would also
like to thank my research assistant Andrew Spillane for his steadfast dedication to this complex
project.
* * Esther van Zimmeren, L.L.M, Research Fellow, The University of Leuven, Centre for
Intellectual Property Rights. Equal contribution by each author.
1 DNA is the term used for the chemical compound known as deoxyribonucleic acid, which
serves as a basic source of genetic material. 2-D ATTORNEY’S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE D-
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has been identified as the BRCA1 gene, as well as a method for
identifying that specified gene in a comparative sample. 2 One year
later, on August 12, 1995, a similar patent application was filed at the
European Patent Office (EPO). 3 Other patent applications swiftly
followed, including a patent application filed in December 1995, for
another key isolated DNA sequence, identified as the BRCA2 sequence,
as well as a method for identifying that specified gene in a comparative
sample. 4 Indeed, patent applications for the same inventions have been
filed in jurisdictions other than the United States and Europe. 5
The Myriad patents (called so because they are in large part owned
by one corporation, Myriad Genetics, Inc., (Myriad) located in Salt
Lake City, Utah), have prompted strong reactions in jurisdictions all
over the world, including the United States, Europe, and Australia.
33566 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2009).
2 The patent application on the BRCA1 gene was initially filed on August 12, 1994. U.S.
Patent No. 289,211 (filed Aug. 12, 1994) [hereinafter ‘289 application]. After a number of
successively filed continuation-in-part applications, U.S. Patent Number 5,747,282 was issued on
May 8, 1998. U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed June 8, 1995) (issued May 8, 1998); see also U.S.
Patent No. 5,693,473 (filed June 7, 1995) (issued Dec. 7, 1997). A number of methods for the
process of detecting specific mutations in the BRCA1 gene, as well as methods for comparing the
individualized tumor and non-tumor BRCA1 gene sequence of a patient sample, originated from
the now abandoned ‘289 patent application. See U.S. Patent No. 570,999 (filed June 7, 1995)
(issued Jan. 20, 1998); U.S. Patent No. 5,710, 001 (filed June 7, 1995) (issued Jan. 20, 1998);
U.S. Patent No. 5,753,441 (filed Jan. 5, 1996) (issued May 19, 1998).
3 European Patent No. 705,902 (filed Aug. 12, 1995).
4 The patent application that identified the BRCA2 sequence was initially filed on December
18, 1995. U.S. Patent No. 573,779 (filed Dec. 18, 1995) [hereinafter ‘779 patent application];
U.S. Patent No. 5,837,492 (filed Apr. 29, 1996) (issued Nov. 17, 1998). A method for comparing
the individualized tumor and non-tumor BRCA2 gene sequence of a patient sample also
originated from the now abandoned ‘779 patent application. U.S. Patent No. 6,033,857 (filed
Mar. 20, 1998) (issued Mar. 7, 2000).
5 Myriad filed for a patent under the Patent Cooperation Treaty for the BRCA1 gene
sequence in February 1996. WO/1996/005307 (filed on Feb. 22, 1996). The patent application
entered into a national sequence in Korea, Finland, Mexico, and New Zealand.
(WO/1996/005307) 17q-Linked Breast and Ovarian Cancer Susceptibility Gene, WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/portal/index.html.en (search WIPO for “WO/1996/005307”; then follow
“(WO/1996/05307) 17-q LINKED BREAST AND OVARIAN CANCER . . .” hyperlink; then
click “National Phase” tab) (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). A patent was issued in New Zealand in
1998, but it was rejected in Korea in 2003. Id. Likewise, Myriad, along with listed co-inventors,
including the Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania, HSC Research Development Limited
Partnership, and Endo Recherle, Inc., filed for a patent under the Patent Cooperation Treaty, for
the BRCA2 gene sequence in 1996. See WO/1997/022,689 (filed Dec. 17, 1996). The patent
application entered into a national phase application in Canada, Mexico, Japan, and New Zealand.
(WO/1997/022689) Chromosome 13-Linked Breast Cancer Susceptibility Gene, WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/portal/index.html.en (search WIPO for “WO/1997/022689”; then follow
(“WO/1997/022689) CHROMOSOME 13-LINKED BREAST CANCER SUSCEPTIBILITY. . .”
hyperlink; then click “National Phase” tab) (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). A patent was issued from
New Zealand in 2000. Id.
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These patents have prompted controversies because they seem so
personal, in that these inventions cover such things as the breast and
ovarian cancer genes, BRCA1 and BRCA2, and their mutations, as well
as diagnostic and therapeutic applications based on the gene’s sequence.
One patient, Lisabeth Ceriani, explaining her opposition to gene patents,
stated, “gene patents,” are “turning our bodies into commerce.” 6 Thus,
the various Myriad debates have raised significant moral and practical
conundrums for patent law.
Equally interesting (but less commented upon) is that in addition to
all of its guises, Myriad provides a compelling example of a changed
policy environment in patent law. The Myriad debates take place in a
policy environment in which calls for patent reform are common.
Congress once again squabbles over whether to create a new post-grant
review proceeding while across the pond 7 , the European Union has
resumed the debate whether to create an EU-wide patent 8 along with a
6

Elizabeth Weise, Is it Unfair to Patent Genes? Successful ACLU Lawsuit Against a BioTech Company Has Some Celebrating, Others Alarmed, USA TODAY, Apr. 10, 2010, at 10B.
7 See Patent Reform Act of 2011, S. 23, 112th Cong. (2011); Patent Reform Act of 2010, S.
515, 111th Cong. §§ 321-36 (2010); Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. §§ 32136 (2009). For further discussion of patent law, see Angela Payne James et al., Recent
Developments in Patent Law and the Potential Impact on Patent Litigation, in PATENT
LITIGATION 2009 249, 287 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, & Literary Property Course Handbook
Series No. 982, 2009).
8 The Belgian Presidency made European Union patents a priority. See PROGRAMME OF THE
BELGIAN PRESIDENCY OF THE EU COUNCIL (2010), http://www.eutrio.be/files/bveu/media/docu
ments/Programme_EN.pdf. Similar major initiatives by former presidencies have failed due to
stagnating negotiations. See, e.g., Press Release, European Parliament, Swedish Ministers
Outline Council Presidency Priorities (Sept. 4, 2009), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu
/news/expert/infopress_page/008-60075-244-09-36-901-20090901IPR60074-01-09-2009-2009
false/default_en.htm (discussing legislative work on the community patent as a priority of the
Swedish Presidency of the European Union); Press Release, Swedish Presidency of the European
Union, Breakthrough for EU Patent During the Swedish Presidency, (Dec. 4, 2009), available at
http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/12407/a/136614 (discussing the EU Member States’ agreement
on a common European Union patent court that will try cases on both the European Union patent
and existing European patents). Unfortunately, the Belgian Presidency also failed to advance a
common patent agenda. As a result, a number of EU Member States decided to launch a
procedure for so-called “enhanced cooperation” which permits a group of at least nine Member
States to create new EU legislation without the cooperation of all the Member States. See Letter
by 10 Member States to the European Commission to Commissioner Michel Barnier, (Dec. 7,
2010), available at http://www.fd.nl/csFdArtikelen/WEB-HFD/y2010/m12/d08/20892331. The
European Commission then submitted a proposal for enhanced cooperation of a unitary EU
patent. Commission Proposal for a Council Decision Authorizing Enhanced Cooperation in the
Area of the Creation of Unitary Patent Protection, COM (2010) 0790 final (Dec. 14, 2010).
“Enhanced cooperation” is also supported by the European Parliament and the Council of the
European Union. Press Release, European Parliament gives go-ahead for enhanced cooperation,
(Feb. 15, 2011), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/en/pressroom/content/20110215IPR1
3680/html/EU-patent-Parliament-gives-go-ahead-for-enhanced-cooperation;
Press
Release
7506/11, Council authorizes enhanced cooperation on creation of unitary patent protection,
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centralized court to hear patent disputes. These debates, along with
recurrent controversies, such as Myriad, while often viewed in isolation
from each other and seemingly preoccupied by different concerns,
actually reflect a shared experience in different jurisdictions—a
reevaluation, if not an outright crisis—over how public authorities
regulate the grant and subsequent enforcement of patents.
Why, at present, does the ability of administrators, to effectively
regulate patents, seem to be compromised? The obvious answer, critics
contend, is that patent administrators are failing in their most basic
tasks. Specifically, critics claim that patent administrators are failing to
examine patent applications quickly, and, if those patents are actually
Moreover, patent
examined, issuing poor quality patents. 9
administrators often cannot stop a patentee from engaging in behavior
that may distort the functioning of a market, such as patent thickets, 10
restrictive licensing techniques, and the litigation claims of so-called
patent trolls. 11
The solutions are seemingly easy. Provide more funding and hire
(March 10, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=PRES/
11/54&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
9 The deficient “quality” of patents has been cited as an ongoing problem in the current
patent system. Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Political Economy of the Patent System, 87
N.C. L. REV. 1341, 1343 (2009) (citing Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Post-Grant
Reviews in the U.S. Patent System: Design Choices and Expected Impact, 19 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J 989, 996–97 (2004)). See Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System,
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 765 (2002) (suggesting that critics of the Patent Office assert that
the patents granted by the same are of poor quality and “facially” invalid or broader than the
actual innovation disclosed in the patent application). Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie has
sought to measure how patent quality can be determined. See Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la
Potterie, The Quality Factor in Patent Systems 12 (ECARES, Working Paper No. 2010-027,
2010), https://dipot.ulb.ac.be:8443/dspace/bitstream/2013/59650/1/2010-027-VANPOTTESLBE
RGHE-qualityfactor.pdf (“Quality is defined as the extent to which patent systems comply with
their own patentability conditions in a transparent way. It is therefore possible to gauge quality
through a two-layer framework: the first layer would be composed of the legal standards that
describe the patentability conditions of a national patent system. The second layer is
characterized by the operation design put in place to meet those standards.”).
10 A patent thicket can be defined as “a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights
that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology.”
See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and StandardSetting, in 7 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119-50 (Adam Jaffe, et al., eds., 2001)
(analyzing patent pools and cross-licenses as a solution for patent thickets, in particular in a
standard setting context).
11 The term “patent troll” is a pejorative term used for an entity that enforces its patents
against one or more alleged infringers in a manner generally considered rather aggressive or
opportunistic and which often does not have an intention to manufacture or market the patented
invention. Therefore, a less pejorative label for this type of entities is “non-practicing entity.”
See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The
Characteristics of the Most Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 101 (2009).
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more examiners to examine patents quickly. 12 Eliminate the ability of
patent trolls to bring superfluous claims. 13 Impose mandatory licensing
rules 14 or use new types of licensing models to provide relief from postenforcement control by patentees. 15
However, patent reform debates in Europe, the United States and
elsewhere are not simply about improving the functioning of patent
regulators. Indeed, various controversies, of which Myriad is one,
indicate that a broader set of questions is at play. Whose interests does
patent law serve? Patent-holders? Competitors? The public? Who is
in the best position to address these respective interests? The
legislature? The executive? The judiciary? Is there a role for the patent
community in this respect? And if so, how could the patent community
optimally exercise this role? These practical controversies have led to
even broader philosophical inquiries. Is patent law still fulfilling the
most basic functions of law? Has it reached its limits? Are other
models more appropriate in an ever-changing technological
environment? 16
12 Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, supra note 9, at 765 (stating
that “[s]everal commentators have noted that the Patent Office is being asked to perform miracles
because it operates under significant budgetary constraints.”). See Arti K. Rai, Addressing the
Patent Gold Rush: The Role of Deference to PTO Patent Denials, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 199,
218 (2000) (noting that one straightforward patent reform proposal involves increasing the
number and quality of patent examiners).
13 Christopher A. Cotropia, The Individual Inventor Motif in the Age of the Patent Troll, 12
YALE J.L. & TECH. 52, 62 (2010) (discussing patent trolls and hold-up, a term referring to the
excessive licensing amounts patent trolls charge for the use of their patents, as a focus in modern
patent reform); Paul J. Heald, Optimal Remedies for Patent Infringement: A Transactional Model,
45 HOUS. L. REV. 1165, 1199 (2008) (“To conclude, one thrust of current patent reform efforts
focuses on remedies, with the most frequent object of discussing being the ‘patent troll,’ the nonexploiting owner of a patent whose business model is based on extracting licensing fees from
unintentional infringers.”).
14 Joseph P. Bauer, Refusals to Deal with Competitors by Owners of Patents and Copyrights:
Reflections on the Image Technical and Xerox Decisions, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1211, 1243–44
(2006) (analyzing how a patent owner may be able to unfairly extend its monopoly through
contracts and licensing agreements, while discussing the mandatory sales and licensing remedy as
problematic).
15 See GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS: PATENT POOLS,
CLEARINGHOUSES AND LIABILITY REGIMES (Geertrui van Overwalle, ed., 2009) (analyzing
different types of licensing models as a solution to patent thickets and patent hold-outs); Geertrui
van Overwalle et al., Models for facilitating access to patents on genetic inventions, 7 NAT. REV.
GENET., 143, 143-48 (2006) (reviewing different models, research exemption, licensing,
collaborative licensing models, compulsory licensing to facilitate access to genetic inventions);
Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting,
in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119-50 (Adam Jaffe, et al., eds., 2001) (analyzing
patent pools and cross-licenses as a solution for patent thickets, in particular in a standard-setting
context).
16 Geertrui Van Overwalle and Esther van Zimmeren, Functions and Limits of Patent Law, in
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These questions are difficult ones. The variety of these questions
exposes a key challenge to how patent law will be governed in a new
era. The old model of patent regulation was, in a word, static. It relied
on seeing the patent agency as a simple registrar of patents, with a
limited ability to consider broader issues related to patent law and
without further interference from other administrative actors or civil
society. The deepening criticism suggests that this static model of
governance is clearly deficient. What then should be the new model?
Hints of a new governance model have emerged. Academic and
policy innovators have offered different “big picture” views of the
newly emerging patent governance. For example, Dr. Francis Gurry,
the Director General of the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) has identified how patent policy-making has emerged from
what he terms a “uni-modular system,” where patent law’s own policies
drove the interests of regulators and stakeholders, to a multi-polar
policy-making system, where the patent system considers and is
impacted by other policy making areas, such as public health and
antitrust. 17 Elsewhere, James Boyle has argued that all intellectual
property law, including patent law, should embrace a greater concern
for democratic decision-making by intellectual property regulators, as
well as a greater institutional diversity in intellectual property decisionmaking (a process Boyle terms “cultural environmentalism”). 18 While
both Gurry and Boyle speculate about different aspects of a new
governance model for the patent system, their work has not offered a
coherent and detailed view on the new patent governance model.
This Article builds on insights expressed elsewhere in our
individual scholarship on governance, as well as in the scholarship of
others. We seek to define what patent governance looks like now and
what we think it should look like in the future. We contend that patent
FACING THE LIMITS OF THE LAW 415, 424-30 (Erik Claes, et al., eds., 2009) (analyzing the failure
of patent law to fulfill its regulatory function, its symbolic function and its “legal guarantees”
function).
17 Francis Gurry, The Evolution of Technology and Markets and the Management of
Intellectual Property Rights, 72 CHI. KENT L. REV. 369, 378 (1996) (discussing the increasing
need for intellectual property law to address other areas of public policy and vice versa). See
Peter K. Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 465, 527 (2009)
(examining the impact of public health considerations on the treaty framework of TRIPS).
18 James Boyle, Cultural Environmentalism and Beyond, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 6
(2007) (defining cultural environmentalism as “an idea, an intellectual and practical movement,
that is supposed to be a solution to a set of political and theoretical problems . . . a set of mental
models, economic nostrums, and property theories that each have a public domain shaped hole at
the center”); JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND
240-43 (2008) (proposing that the achievement of genuine democratic politics of intellectual
property requires an institutionally diverse debate).
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governance is gradually becoming—and should become—more
dynamic. This means including more diverse administrative actors,
from varied policy contexts, and enabling more interaction between
these administrative actors, on the one hand, and an active public, on the
other hand.
In Part Two, we will describe the contours of the emerging model
of “dynamic” patent governance. In Part Three, we will analyze the
potential consequences associated with the principles of dynamic
governance. In Part Four, we will examine the lessons of the recent
Myriad gene patent litigation in the United States and Europe in order to
analyze how dynamic patent governance works in practice. Finally,
utilizing lessons from the first four sections, in Section Five, we draw
normative conclusions as to the impact of a model of dynamic patent
governance on the particular challenges that currently confront the
institutional design of the patent regime.
This Article proceeds from a particular perspective; we seek to
integrate governance debates that occur and have occurred in both the
United States and Europe. A common challenge has been that many
academic and reform debates on patent law have carried on in isolation
from each other. Perhaps, the best way to describe this situation is to
resort to the old metaphor of the blind man and the elephant. 19 We all
see the various administrative elements of the systems that we are
familiar with, but in doing so, cannot perceive the larger picture: the
changing nature of patent governance. Aware of this problem, this
Article attempts to provide a more complete view of patent governance.
II. DYNAMIC PATENT GOVERNANCE: THE MODEL
A theory of dynamic patent governance seeks to address the impact
of two key changes in patent law: (1) the emergence of a more diverse
set of institutional actors; and (2) the emergence of a more diverse set of
stakeholders in patent law. These two changes reflect the relevance of a
concept that has been explored more thoroughly in other regulatory
contexts, such as environmental 20 and international law—the
development of the theoretical model of network governance. 21 Put
19 A famous western adaptation by John Godfrey Saxe, describes a tale of six blind men who
traveled to see an elephant; each encountered a separate portion of the elephant along the way and
vehemently disagreed as to the proper account of the elephant based on their isolated and varying
experiences. JOHN G. SAXE, CLEVER STORIES OF MANY NATIONS 59-64 (1865).
20 Peter M. Haas, Addressing the Global Governance Deficit, 4 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 1, 13
(2004).
21 Id. at 13.
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simply, the theoretical model of network governance is used to explain
how a variety of autonomous actors operate in interdependent
relationships—without necessarily being restricted to a hierarchical
relationship—to govern the systems in which they participate. 22 The
underlying idea of network governance is that the effective functioning
and legitimacy of the system “as a whole” is more than the mere
aggregation of individual public organizations’ performances. 23 Thus,
network governance differs significantly from classic theories of
regulation, which tend to focus solely on the formal institutions of
government and less on the interrelationships between formal
institutions and informal actors outside of those institutions. 24
We observe that the idea of network governance is emerging
within the context of patent law, and extend this model in two additional
ways. First, we claim that within its formal dimensions, the patent
system should be analyzed as a whole, focusing on the roles played by
various actors, rather than the individual institutional actors themselves.
This focus on roles, rather than individual actors, also greatly facilitates
comparison of governance systems between different jurisdictions. 25
As we examine the roles of institutional actors, we contend that the
formal dimensions of the patent system have been changed by the
emergence of heterogeneous administrative and judicial actors.
Heterogeneity of the patent system suggests that more than one
administrative actor can and will seek to regulate the grant and
22 Orly Lobel, relying on a variety of recent scholarship, has identified a number of key
characteristics of network governance, including: (1) participation by a variety of different actors
at various stages of the legal process; (2) collaboration by these actors through the regulatory
process; (3) institutional diversity that emphasizes a multitude of legal values in decision-making;
(4) decentralization of power through state and regulatory actors; (5) the integration of different
policy domains; (6) flexibility in regulatory solutions; (7) dynamism in policy outcomes that
leads to more frequent revision of regulatory goals; and (8) a policy commitment to orchestrating
the different actors within a networked system. See generally Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The
Fall of Regulation and The Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 342 (2004-2005).
23 Susana Borrás, The Governance of the European Patent System: Effective and Legitimate?,
35 ECON. & SOC’Y 594, 598 (2006).
24 See Richard Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
437, 439-43 (2003) (analyzing major theoretical frameworks associated with the development of
administrative law in the United States). See generally PAUL CRAIG, EU ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
(2006) (analyzing the development of administrative law within the context of the European
Union).
25 Our examination of this model in the following sections takes place primarily within the
context of a comparative framework between the European Union and the United States, as is
demonstrated by our primary reliance on these models throughout our text. We believe, however,
that our model has relevance across diverse patent regimes, and so our examples in the footnote
citations refer to a variety of different patent regimes.
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enforcement of patents.
Until recently, analyses of patent
administrative law have exclusively focused on the role of the patent
examiner in the issuance of a given patent. This approach ignores the
impact that other regulators, like other agencies or subsequent judicial
actors, may have on the ongoing evolution of patent law. Such an
approach obscures a key insight, namely that, regulation of patent law is
undertaken at multiple administrative sites during the life of an issued
patent. 26
Second, we believe that, consistent with the idea of network
governance, the informal dimension of the patent regime has been
impacted by a plurality of actors that actively influence legislation and
policy-making, such as states, companies, national or regional agencies,
international organizations, such as the WIPO and World Trade
Organization (WTO), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as
patient advocacy groups, human rights organizations, medical
associations and scientific organizations. These actors are likely to have
a number of instruments at their disposal, such as persuasion, economic
pressure, norm creation and manipulation. 27 We deepen this theoretical
insight, however, by examining the specific fissures between informal
actors in the patent regime. In particular, we claim that the emergence
of “new” actors on the patent scene, such as NGOs (whom we
collectively term the “patent civil society”), brings them into conflict
with the more settled stakeholders of the “epistemic” communities that
have traditionally driven patent policy-decision-making.
Ultimately, we argue that the emergence of these trends—
heterogeneous
administrative
actors
and
maturing
patent
communities—has led to a more dynamic administrative context for
patent law. Therefore, it is vital to explore the patterns of formal and
informal interactions among the wide variety of public and private
actors that constitute the patent governance system, both at interorganizational and inter-personal levels. We first explore the formal
dimension in terms of the heterogeneous nature of the patent system.
We next describe a maturing informal dimension in which different
types of stakeholder communities seek to weigh in on the decision26 This heterogeneity framework has been previously introduced within the context of the
United States. See generally Kali Murray, The Cooperation of Many Minds: Domestic Patent
Reform in a Heterogeneous Regime, 48 IDEA: INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 289 (2008) (using
doctrines of administrative framework, such as the Chevron deference framework, that are
specific to the jurisprudential context of the United States, in discussing the heterogeneous
framework). These doctrines are not discussed in this Article, as we are examining these issues
within a comparative framework.
27 Scott Burris et al., Nodal Governance, 30 AUST. J. LEG. PHIL. 30, 31 (2005).
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making by the formal actors.
A. Dynamic Patent Governance: The Formal Dimension and
Heterogeneity
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Susana Borrás defines the “formal” dimension of network
governance as “the set of constitutive regulations that govern the
interactions between the public [actors] that grant, control and rule
about individual patents and their use, abuse and infringement in the
market.” 28 While patent literature has often focused on the role of the
examining agency, the concept of heterogeneity examines a broader
range of public actors. A heterogeneous perspective of institutional
actors within the patent governance system starts with the assumption
that the roles of institutional actors may be consistent across patent
administrative systems. Two kinds of roles are possible. First, primary
actors are tasked with regulating the resource on an ongoing basis.
Second, secondary actors can be tasked to regulate a resource, by either
replicating the role of the primary actor in a narrower content area, or by
using their expertise derived from other content areas to impact patent
law. Thus, actors within the context of patent law have to navigate an
increasingly complex formal dimension. Diagram 1 provides a visual
depiction of the primary actors (legislators, examiners, and reviewers),
discussed in Part II.A.1, and their relationship to the secondary actors,
discussed in Part II.A.2.

PATENT
LEGISLATION,
POLICY and
CASE LAW

28

Borrás, supra note 23, at 598.

f

Primary Actors (legislators,
examiners, reviewers)
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1. The Formal Dimension: Primary Actors
We first examine the role of primary actors within a patent
governance system.
Primary actors (legislators, examiners, and
reviewers) fulfill three key tasks in a patent administrative system.
First, the legislative actor creates the regulatory framework for the other
primary and secondary actors. 29 Second, the primary administrative
actor determines whether the patent should be granted and whether an
issued patent is valid or infringed. As such, patent reform efforts have
typically focused on changing the behavior of the primary actors that
fulfill the role of issuing a patent or determining that it infringes on a
pre-existing one. Finally, the administrative and judicial review of a
patent after its grant is the third major task of a patent system.
a. Primary Actors: The Legislator
The legislature plays an intermittent but important role within the
context of patent policy-making. It sets the roles of the other actors
through its grants of regulatory powers, which require considerable
institutional, philosophical, economic, and policy choices.
Indeed, legislators are often responsible for the increased
importance of the secondary actors. For instance, in the United States,
congressional attempts to regulate patent law have led to the growing
importance of a number of secondary actors. For example, Congress
expanded the roles of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the
context of patent drug regulation in 1984; 30 the United States
International Trade Commission (USITC) in 1988, in the context of
import litigation; 31 the United States Trade Representative (USTR) in
29

As to the role of the legislative actors, this Article expands on the discussion contained in
Kali Murray’s article, The Cooperation of Many Minds, which emphasized the role of the
legislative actor as an initiator of the institutional design of the heterogeneous regime. Murray,
supra note 26, at 299. The role of the legislature, however, was seen as limited to the initial
design. Id. at 299. Here, we emphasize that the legislative actor actually serves as a node within
the patent governance system.
30 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1585 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 n.355, 360cc (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006); 35 U.S.C.
§§ 156, 271, 282 (2006)). See Mary E. Wictorowicz, Emergent Patterns in the Regulation of
Pharmaceuticals: Institutions and Interests in the United States, Canada, Britain, and France, 28
J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 615, 631–36 (2003) (discussing FDA oversight); Devesh Srivastava,
The Food and Drug Administration and Patent Law at a Crossroad: The Listing of Polymorph
Patents as a Barrier to Generic Drug Entry, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 339 (2004) (examining the
role of the FDA in deciding the entry of generic drugs into the market is concerned with
pharmaceutical and therapeutic considerations).
31 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006); Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional
Regulation of the ITC, 61 FLA. L. REV. 529, 533 (2009) (asserting that the International Trade
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1988, in the context of negotiating intellectual property agreements;32
and the United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) in the context of the review of patented
pharmaceutical settlement systems. 33
Legislatures, with their increased responsiveness to different
stakeholders often play a crucial intervening role in the patent system.
Legislative interference, however, bears significant risks. Legislative
intervention is sporadic, in a temporal and ideological sense. In a
temporal sense, different legislators may often add language to an
enacting statute over time without consideration as to its textual
consistency and clarity. A famous example of this in the United States
is the Copyright Act of 1976, which has lost significant textual cohesion
over time. 34 A European example is the EU Trademark Regulation,
which was substantially amended over time and, as a result, had to be
re-codified in the interest of “clarity and rationality.” 35 Likewise, two
ideological risks present themselves. First, legislators may undertake
significant reform in response to the narrow concerns of epistemic elite
without taking into account broader public concerns. Second, this risk
can be compounded further if legislators are subject to industry pressure
on a given issue. Each of these risks can undermine the credibility of a
patent regime to the larger public.
b. Primary Actors: The Examining Administrator
The most basic task of any patent system is to provide inventors
Commission undertakes patent assessment under § 1337); Colleen Chien, Patently Protectionist?
An Empirical Analysis of Patent Cases at the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 63, 110 (2008) (contending that the International Trade Commission may create patent
policy inconsistent with precedents of the Supreme Court).
32 See, e.g., Omnibus Trade Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1302, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988)
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (2006)); Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, “Special
301:” Its Requirements, Implementation, and Significance, 13 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 259 (1990)
(describing the United States Trade Representative’s authority to put countries it perceives to
have inadequate intellectual property laws on watch lists under “Special 301” powers provided by
the Omnibus Trade Act of 1988).
33 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006); Lisa M. Ferri & Monique A. Morneault, Reverse Payment Patent
Settlements: The Interplay of Antitrust and Patent Policies, 20 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 14,
16-17 (2008) (discussing the FTC’s power to review patent litigation settlements under the
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act); Murray, supra note 26, at
314, 327 (discussing the responsibility given to the FTC to analyze the antitrust and consumer
consequences associated with the grant of a patent under section 5 of the Clayton Antitrust Act
and the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA)).
34 See, e.g., David Nimmer, Codifying Copyright Comprehensibly, 51 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1233
(2004) (examining the problematic revisions of the Copyright Act of 1976).
35 Council Regulation 207/2009, 2009 O.J. (L78) 1.
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with a functional way to obtain a patent. Three models exist as to how
to obtain a patent. The patentee can register a claim on an invention,
rely on another examination conducted by another country or regional
organization, or submit to a substantive examination. A patent registry
is the simplest choice. A patent registry involves minimal effort on the
part of the administrator since the potential patentee simply registers the
patent without a substantive examination.
The direct contrast to the patent registry is an administrative
system premised on substantive examination at the national level.
Substantive examination, of course, is a complex undertaking. Such
systems require significant investment in personnel and in articulating
standardized examination and review procedures. The use of a patent
registry, however, even if capable of resolving basic disputes, 36 such as
how to resolve competing claims between inventors, may be untenable.
Article 27 of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement) requires signatory countries to
carry out a substantive inquiry into novelty and inventive step. 37
A number of systems have developed a median approach in which
the administrator relies on another agency—a national agency and/or a
regional organization—to conduct the relevant search and examination
of the patent. The hybrid examination approach is possible given both
the structure of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) 38 and regional
treaties such as the Andean Pact. 39 These treaties allow a patentee to
designate a state or regional entity responsible for the examination. The
hybrid examination approach is particularly useful for developing
countries as it allows them to comply with the TRIPS Agreement in the
36 Robert C. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights
For Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 594-95 (1999)
(noting that the patent registry system did not work, despite low entry barrier, because of high
cost associated with determining disputes between potential patent litigants).
37 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 27, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND VOL. 31 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 81, 1997 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPs].
38 PATENT COOPERATION TREATY, JUNE 19, 1970, 28. U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231,
amended on Sept. 28, 1979, modified on FEB. 3, 1984 AND OCT. 3, 2001, http://www.wipo.int/
export/sites/www/pct/en/texts/pdf/pct.pdf (international patent treaty administered by WIPO
covering one hundred and forty-two contracting states and providing a unified procedure for
filing patent applications).
39 Andean Subregional Integration Agreement, May 26, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 910, as amended by
Trujillo Protocol, Mar. 10, 1996. See Common Provisions on Industrial Property, Decision No.
486 of Sept. 14, 2002 of the Commission of the Andean Community, http://www.comunidad
andina.org/ingles/normativa/D486e.htm) (discussing the bifurcated examination system of the
Andean Pact).
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face of considerable difficulties on the ground.
c. Primary Actors: The Reviewers
Two types of actors can review the consequences of a grant in an
issued patent. Internal administrative actors can review the validity of
an issued patent using designated administrative procedures. External
judicial actors can undertake review of the validity and infringement of
an issued patent. It is possible for the roles of these primary reviewers
to overlap, but often these reviewers follow different procedures and
have different responsibilities within the context of a given patent
regime.
Evidence exists that indicates that the availability of
administrative and judicial review procedures in a patent system
provides the maximum flexibility for parties seeking to challenge the
issuance of a patent. 40
Internal administrative review is quite varied. The two most
common post-issuance procedures are re-examination and opposition.
A re-examination typically involves a request to review the content of a
patent in light of previously undisclosed information. The process of
re-examination often has significant disadvantages including: (1) limits
on what type of patent can be significantly re-examined; 41 (2) limits on
the type of the appeal that can be undertaken in a dispute 42 ; and (3)
limits on the type of information that can be submitted. 43 By contrast,
opposition proceedings generally offer the opportunity to challenge an
issued patent on broader substantive and procedural grounds. For
40 Jay P. Kesan, Office Oppositions and Patent Invalidation in Court: Complements or
Substitutes?, in PATENT LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 269
(Toshiko Takenada, ed., 2008) (examining the use of complementary initial trial and examination
systems by Japan and concluding that institutional reasons exist for maintaining two systems).
See Patentgesetz [Austrian Patent Act] Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl] No. 259/1970, §§ 47 ¶ 1, 102
(Austria) (providing both re-examination and opposition as post-issuance procedures); see also
Patentgesetz [Patent Act], Dec. 16, 1980, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, TEIL I [BGBl. I], §§ 81(4),
27(3) (F.R.G.) (as amended by Laws of July 16 and August 6, 1998).
41 See, e.g., Patentgesetz [Patent Act] of 1970 § 91 ¶ 3 (Austria) (providing that reexamination allows the owner of the patent to make certain amendments to its original claim);
Poland Industrial Property Law of 30 June 2000, art. 37(1), as amended, June 29, 2007,
http://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou_e/s_sonota_e/fips_e/pdf/poland_e/e_sangyou.pdf (providing that
re-examination process allows a patentee to make restricted additions and corrections to its
application).
42 See, e.g., Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 306 (1952) (providing that only a patentee may
appeal a disputed re-examination request).
43 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 101 (Austl.), http://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou_e/s_sonota_e/fips_e/
pdf/australia_e/e_tokkyo.pdf (providing that the Australian Patent Act allows a patentee and any
other person to undertake a re-examination request on substantive patent grounds, but limits the
right to appeal a re-examination request to the patentee).
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instance, Article 100 of the European Patent Convention (EPC) allows
opposition based, among other things, on allegations that the invention
is not patent eligible, not new, does not involve an inventive step or is
insusceptible of industrial application or that the invention has been
insufficiently disclosed. 44 A broad number of parties can start
opposition proceedings, and appeal in case of a disputed outcome. 45
External judicial actors can undertake initial review of factual
and legal issues that impact an issued patent, as well as appellate review
of that initial review. The design of these basic roles, though, is subject
to considerable variety. Such variety arises from two diverse sources.
The first source of such jurisdictional variety is the difficulty of review
associated with an issued patent. Reviewing an issued patent is not an
easy judicial undertaking. The reviewer has to undertake several
difficult legal inquiries associated with the validity and potential
infringement of a patent. In addition, the technical nature of the
underlying technology can complicate patent review.
Often, then, the question is whether patent law should be subject to
a specialized external review that takes into consideration the difficulty
of these inquiries. Patent systems have answered this question in
different ways, including: (1) creating a specialized trial court to address
patent-related questions; 46 (2) creating a specialized appellate court that
reviews generalized initial review; 47 (3) allowing a full-fledged judicial
proceeding within the administrative agency and then allowing for
subsequent review by general appellate proceeding; 48 and (4) providing
for a specialized trial and appellate review. 49 Thus, while the challenge
44 See, e.g., Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 100, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065
U.N.T.S. 255 [hereinafter European Patent Convention], available at http://www.epo.org/lawpractice/legal-texts/html/epc/1973/e/ma1.html (follow links to different Convention articles)
(outlining grounds for an opposition proceeding).
45 Id. art. 99(1) (outlining the type of party that may bring an opposition proceeding under the
EPC); id. art. 107 (outlining the broad right of appeal to the opposition proceeding).
46 See, e.g., The Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 97(l) (Eng.), http://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou_e/
s_sonata_e/fps_e/pdf/england_e/e_tokkyo.pdf (providing that petitioners may directly appeal
decisions of the Intellectual Property Office to the Patent Court, a specialized trial court, and
subsequently appeal those decisions to the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords).
47 See, e.g., Patentgesetz [Patent Act] of 1970 § 65(1)-(2) (Austria) (providing that an
independent federal appellate court, the Federal Patent Court, be established for the purpose of
hearing appeals from decisions of the examining sections or patent divisions of the patent
offices).
48 See, e.g., Patentgesetz [Patent Act] of 1970 §§ 57 ¶ 1, 70 ¶¶ 1-3 (Austria) (providing that
final decisions of the technical and legal department may be appealed to the appellate division of
the Patent Office and then to the Supreme Patent and Trademark Board, and that final decisions
of the nullity department may be appealed to the Supreme Patent and Trademark Board as the
highest level of authority).
49 For instance, in Japan, the Tokyo and Osaka District Courts enjoy jurisdictional authority
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presented by specialization is common to all patent systems, significant
experimentation exists over how to solve this challenge. For instance,
the experience of the United States, which since 1982 has had
centralized appellate review, has prompted significant debate over
whether a specialized court creates the risk of excessive insularity and
inadequately nuanced jurisprudence. 50 At the same time, Europe has
for decades been contemplating the creation of a centralized litigation
system. 51 A major impetus for imposing centralized litigation in Europe
is the complexity of patent law in the post-grant phase, as well as the
possibility that national courts may, for instance, issue different
opinions regarding the validity of the same patent. 52
External review of patents also can vary because of a second

over design and utility patent infringement. The Intellectual Property High Court enjoys
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent infringement appeals. See David Hill & Shinichi
Murada, Patent Litigation in Japan, 1 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 151 (2007) (outlining the
division of judicial authority over patent related materials).
50 See Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101
NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1646–49 (2007) (contending that the limited jurisprudence of the Federal
Circuit arises because of its “institutional position, failure to adapt its common law to changing
circumstances, reticence to consider empirical and economic literature and expansive judicial
authority”); compare Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment
in Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 770 (2004) (“Practitioners appear to be in
general agreement that centralizing patent appeals in a single court is a vast improvement over
regional adjudication.” (citing Carl Tobias, The White Commission and the Federal Circuit, 10
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 58 (2000))).
51 Draft Agreement on the European and Community Patents Court and Draft Statute,
(Working Document 7928/09 PI 23 COUR 29, 2009), http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en
/09/st07/st07928.en09.pdf.
52 For example, the European Central Bank has challenged the Document Security System’s
[DSS] patent in numerous jurisdictions. To date, the validity of the DSS’s patent has been upheld
in the Netherlands and Spain. See Rb. Gravenhage 12 Maart 2008, 269923/HA ZA 06-2495 (De
Europese Centrale Bank/Document Security Systems, Inc.) [European Central Bank v. Document
Security Systems] (Neth.), available at http://www.boek9.nl/index.php?//The+European+Central
+Bank+vs.+Document+Security+Systems%2C+Inc.////22333/; Mary Stone, Court Rules
Document Security Systems Patent Valid in Spain, ROCHESTER BUS. J., Mar. 24, 2010,
http://rbj.flex360hosting.com/article.asp?aID=183392. The patent has been invalidated in
Germany, the United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium, and France. See Mary Stone, Document
Security Systems Loses in German Court, ROCHESTER BUS. J., July 9, 2010, http://www.rbj.net/
article.asp?aID=184435; Press Release, Document Security Systems Announces Ruling in Patent
Validity Lawsuit in United Kingdom (Mar. 26, 2007), available at http://documentsecurity.com/
press_releases.php?id=72; Document Securities Systems, Inc. Announces Ruling in Patent
Validity Hearing by Austrian Patent Office, REUTERS, Nov. 20, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/
finance/stocks/keyDevelopments?rpc=66&symbol=DMC&timestamp=20100804150600;
Document Security Systems Announces Ruling in Patent Validity Lawsuit in Belgium Court, PR
NEWSWIRE, Nov. 3, 2009, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/document-security-systems
-announces-ruling-in-patent-validity-lawsuit-by-belgiumcourt-68964912.html; Cour’ d’appel
[CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, ch. 1, Mar. 17, 2010, No. 08/09140 (Fr.), http://www.
eplawpatentblog.com/2010/March/SCN_20100317152247_001%5B1%5D.pdf.
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source of institutional multiplicity—the relationship of the external
judicial actor with the broader system of judicial authority. For
instance, Australia and Canada allow both federal and state courts to
undertake an initial review of patents. By contrast, the United States
only allows federal courts to review patent cases. 53
The European “constitutional” 54 system has proven to be a
particularly resonant example of how the structure of the patent regime
can impact policy-making. Specifically, the interplay between regional
and national institutions results in a complex regulatory environment in
which to review the consequences of a given patent. The EPO, which is
an inter-governmental body independent of the institutional framework
of the European Union, can review an issued patent through an
opposition proceeding. 55 Within the European “constitutional” system,
once the EPO has issued a patent, the European patent becomes a
“bundle” of national patents, which are subject to judicial decisions on
validity and infringement in all the different Member States. 56 The
European Courts in Luxemburg do not have any powers regarding
patents granted by the EPO. 57 As a result, no system currently exists for
issuing a European Union wide determination on the validity and
infringement of a given patent.
The difficulties of this structure are amplified by the basic
differences in the legal culture between common-law and continental
law systems at the national level. Judicial actors within a common law
system may more readily accept their roles as active policymakers 58 in
setting patent policies than judges in continental law systems. The
Court of Justice of the European Union has repeatedly been criticized
for its activist role in other matters beyond patent law. 59 Thus,
53

28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)(2006) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights
and trademark.”).
54 The European Union nor the European Patent Office have an underlying “constitutional”
structure as they cannot be regarded as states. We continue, however, to use the term, first, for
reasons of comparison, and second, to stress that the historical, underlying institutional structures
are the main cause for complexity at the European level.
55 European Patent Convention, supra note 44, art. 99.
56 Id. art. 64.
57 See, e.g., G2/06 WARF/Stem Cells, [2009] E.P.O.R. 15 (EPO Enlarged Bd. App.)
58 Judicial reviewers (e.g. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) in the United States are
often reluctant to acknowledge their role as policymakers, insisting rather that they decide
disputes between parties, despite the often-clear consequences of their decisions. See Colleen
Chien, Patent Amicus Briefs: What the Courts’ Friends Can Teach Us About the Patent System, 1
U.C. I. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2010).
59 See, e.g., PATRICK NEIL, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE. A CASE STUDY IN JUDICIAL
ACTIVISM (1995); Trevor Hartley, The European Court, Judicial Objectivity and the Constitution
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foundational conceptions of the appropriate exercise of judicial
discretion may also play a key role in how external review of patent law
takes place.
2. The Formal Dimension: Secondary Actors
Primary actors, obviously, have a strong role to play within patent
law. Patent doctrine, though, has become more diverse over time. It
has incorporated new subject matter, such as topics related to public
health, antitrust, unfair competition and trade. These changes have had
the consequence of strengthening the role of what we term secondary
actors 60 within the domestic and regional patent systems. These
secondary administrative actors may have significant authority to
articulate policy over issued patents that are outside of the orbit of the
primary actors. The roles of these actors can be placed into two
categories, replicative and expertise actors.
Initially, a replicative actor serves to supplement the role of a
primary internal or adjudicative actor. These actors may serve to
replicate the policy determinations of the primary actors. These
replicators may have a significant impact on the development of
doctrinal development. For example, the Plant Variety Protection
Office within the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) reviews and
grants Certificates of Plant Variety Protection (CPVP), extending
breeders up to twenty-five years of exclusive control over new sexually
reproduced or tuber plant varieties meeting certain criteria. 61 The
CPVP function of the USDA mirrors and supplements the patentgranting powers of the USPTO, but these powers apply exclusively to
asexually produced plants and provide mutually exclusive remedies. 62
Although CPVPs do not duplicate plant patents, jurisprudence produced
by CPVP litigation inevitably adds to the body of plant patent doctrine,
albeit indirectly, through policy determinations. Thus, any discussion
of patent policy-making necessarily includes an understanding of these
additional actors since they can have a significant effect on the doctrinal
development of patent law.
A secondary actor can also assume authority over patent policy
of the European Union, 112 L. Q. REV. 95 (1996); Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, Judicial Activism of
the European Court of Justice and the Development of the European Social Mode in AntiDiscrimination and Consumer Law (EUI LAW, Working Paper No. 2009/19, 2009).
60 A typology of secondary actors (replicative and expertise actors) and several examples of
secondary actors (e.g., U.S. Department of Agriculture and US Federal Trade Commission) is
provided below. These actors are further defined in the Chart in Part II.A.
61 Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2582 (2006).
62 Plant Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2006).
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because of a designated expertise in an unrelated subject matter. Two
kinds of expertise actors are common within a patent regime.
Competition regulators may examine the impact of the behavior of a
patentee on competition law. 63 Drug administrators may review a
previously patented drug. 64 While these types of expertise actors may
supplement the policy determinations of the primary actor, these actors
can become potential rivals to the policy actor in defining the limits of
an issued patent or the behavior of the patentee. For example, if the
competition authority would limit the ability of patent owners to
restrictively license a patent, such a limitation could weaken the power
of a patentee to decide on the exploitation of the patent.
3. The Heterogeneous Actors in Network Governance
The activity of heterogeneous institutional “actors” creates an
increasingly decentralized regulatory environment in which to address
issues associated with the grant of a patent. Despite the increasingly

63 John DeQ Briggs, Intellectual Property and Antitrust: Two Scorpions in a Bottle, 10
SEDONA CONF. J. 65, 66 (2009) (examining the role of the Federal Trade Commission and its
suggestion that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office consider the possible harm to competition
before extending the scope of patentable subject matter); JONATHAN D.C. TURNER,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND EU COMPETITION LAW (2010) (examining the regulatory
framework for the exploitation and licensing of intellectual property rights, including patents).
64 The role of the Food and Drug Administration is well understood within the context of the
patent law of the United States. See Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law,
22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 335 (2009) (quoting Professors Robert Merges, Peter Mennell and
Mark Lemley, in regard to administrative review in the United States, “[a] patent does not
automatically grant an affirmative right to do anything; patented pharmaceuticals, for instance,
must still pass regulatory review at the Food and Drug Administration to be sold legally.”). Drug
regulators’ roles in other countries are equally interesting. For example in Canada, while the
provincial governments exercise the primary control over the license of patented pharmaceuticals,
the federal government of Canada can supplement these policies by determining whether a drug
can be sold or has been sold at an excessive price. See Melanie Bourassa Forcier & Jean-Frederic
Morin, Canadian Pharmaceutical Policy: International Constraints and Domestic Priorities, in
AN EMERGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PARADIGM: PERSPECTIVE FROM CANADA 81, 87-89
(Ysolde Gondreau, ed., 2008). By contrast, in Europe, legislation does not allow “patent
linkage,” which operates by linking market approval for generic medicines, as well as their
pricing and reimbursement status, to the patent status of the original reference product. European
Commission Final Report for the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry at 130, (July 8, 2009)
[hereinafter Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry], http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuti
cals/inquiry/staff_working_paper_part1.pdf (explaining that “ . . . the authorisation to market a
medicinal product is taken on the basis of scientific criteria concerning the quality, safety, and
efficacy of the medicinal product concerned: these criteria are related to public health
considerations, and no other criteria should be taken into account. All other issues relating to
private law, such as for example, the patent status of the medicinal product, are to be dealt with
on the basis of patent laws before the competent courts . . . .”). This has the consequence of
disaggregating market approval of generics from broader patent issues.
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decentralized nature of network governance, the role of formal
institutional actors may actually be strengthened since they can serve as
centralized points in this decentralized policy environment.
Scott Burris, Peter Drahos and Clifford Shearing have termed these
centralized points as “nodes” within the networks. 65 These “nodes” are
entities with a set of technologies, mentalities and resources that
mobilize the knowledge and capacity of members to manage the course
of events. 66 While nodes may take a wide variety of forms, from
legislators and government agencies through NGOs to firms or even
gangs, formal patent actors—whether primary or secondary—can serve
as crucial nodes in network governance. 67 By serving as “nodes,”
formal patent actors can formalize the roles of different stakeholders
within a given community by offering a forum and associated
procedures where stakeholder concerns can be heard, such as reexamination and opposition procedures.
Moreover, formal patent actors can themselves collaborate on
patent policy and procedure, thus intensifying their organizational
power within the network. This way, they create “super-structural
nodes.” 68 Super-structural nodes are the sites that bring together
different nodal organizations so as to concentrate resources and
technologies of the individual nodes for a common purpose. 69 Superstructural nodes have emerged consistently within the patent regime,
and can be either short-term or long-term in nature. For instance, the
USPTO, the Japanese Patent Office (JPO), and the EPO have
collaborated to create a “super-structural” node by way of “Trilateral
This trilateral co-operation has a number of
Co-operation.” 70
objectives, such as improving the quality of examination processes,
reducing the processing time of patent applications, improving the
quality of incoming applications, developing common infrastructure for

65 See generally Burris et al., Nodal Governance, supra note 27; Peter Drahos, Intellectual
Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: A Nodal Governance Approach, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 401,
401-24 (2004); Scott Burris, Governance, Microgovernance and Health, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 335,
335-58 (2004); Peter Drahos et al., Group Discussion at RegNet Conference: The Nodal and the
Global (Dec. 10, 2003).
66 See generally Burris et al., Nodal Governance, supra note 27. For instance, a patent
examining agency has specific procedures (examination and rulemakings) and tools (e.g., budget
and/or databases) to carry out its specific tasks. Applicants and other stakeholders can use these
procedures to influence the decision-making process. Thus, patent examining agencies can serve
as a formalized “node” within the context of network governance.
67 Burris et al., Nodal Governance, supra note 27, at 38.
68 Id. at 31-38.
69 Id. at 31-38.
70 TRILATERAL, http://www.trilateral.net (last visited Sept. 3, 2010).
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electronic systems and search tools, and solving common problems
related to the protection of industrial property rights by harmonizing the
practices of the three Offices. 71
B. Dynamic Patent Governance: Its Informal Dimension
The informal dimension of dynamic patent governance is
increasingly contributes to the dynamic nature of patent governance.
Recent patent governance has seen the emergence of a wide continuum
of stakeholders entering the patent system, whose aims and objectives
are potentially in conflict with each other.
Modern patent law has typically relied on well-organized and wellinformed epistemic communities, which have played an out-sized role
in patent law decision-making. Epistemic communities, as identified by
Susana Borrás, share a set of:
[W]orldviews, common understandings, norms, routines and daily
practices that define the interactions among public and private
organizations and individual actors in the patent system. [Patent]
Governance [then] takes place within networks of stakeholders,
patent professionals and practitioners, who form powerful
[epistemic] communities—sometimes competing against each
other—and whose interactions decisively influences the shape of the
patent system. 72

These epistemic communities have formed increasingly powerful
networks that work to influence patent policy-making across multiple
institutional forums.
Recently, however, patent law has also been impacted by what we
term a more loosely defined, “patent civil society.” This civil society is
often composed of constituted groups of consumers, patients,
physicians, scientists, interested citizens, and other non-patent experts,
that seek to participate in patent policy-making. This patent civil
society has played a disruptive role, in recent patent policy-making,
often criticizing the basic norms of the well-settled epistemic
communities. This Part considers both the epistemic communities and
patent civil society in turn.
1. The Informal Dimension: Epistemic Communities
Patent law is widely regarded as a very complex field of law
because of its difficult legal framework, procedures and concepts, as
71
72

Id. See infra Part V.B.
Borrás, supra note 23, at 598.
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well as the inherently technical nature of patents. The complex nature
of patent law has led to decision-making by highly qualified technical
and legal experts. 73 The dominant core of these epistemic communities
consists of transnational firms with important patent portfolios,
technically sophisticated lawyers, legal academics, and legally trained
scientific experts and officials. Such actors have a strong impact on the
patent system as well as patent policy on the national, regional and
international levels. Over the past decades, patent governance has
become the almost exclusive province of an epistemic community of
patent experts. 74
Epistemic communities continue to shape patent law reform,
policies, and doctrine. First, epistemic communities have been closely
involved in shaping the various proposals for patent law reform
discussed on both sides of the Atlantic. Epistemic industrial and
professional organizations 75 actively engage with legislators throughout
the patent reform process since most politicians do not have any
expertise with respect to patents.
Second, the inauguration of new policies concerning patent
procedure and issuance is often preceded by internal and/or external
consultations. Epistemic participants continue to shape policies which
are favorable to them in these internal or external consultations. The
types of consultations may vary due to various administrative cultures.
Consultations can range from relatively informal discussion forums,
where all interest groups have an opportunity to be represented, to more
formalized procedures, in which ad hoc panels or institutionalized
bodies consider policies with accompanying formalized procedures. An
example of an informal consultation are the public hearings conducted
in 2006 by the European Commission on “Future Patent Policy in
Europe,” whereas an example of a more formalized procedure is the
notice and comment rule-making conducted by the USPTO under the

73 William Gormley has proposed a framework that seeks to explain levels of public interest
in certain subjects. See generally William Gormley, Regulatory Issue Networks in a Federal
System, 18 POLITY 595 (1986). He classifies patent law as an area characterized by high
complexity (significant technical specialization) but low salience (relevance to the public). Id. at
598. The emergence of a broader patent civil society suggests that the salience of patent law has
been improving in a significant sense.
74 PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? (2003).
75 Examples of such professional organizations are the International Association for the
Protection of Intellectual Property (AIPPI), the International Association for the Advancement of
Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property (ATRIP), and the American Intellectual Property
Association (AIPLA).
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Administrative Procedure Act. 76 While in principle the latter process
would seem likely to prompt significant epistemic participation, broader
discussion forums offer a platform to both epistemic communities and
civil society to provide their insights. Experience shows, however, that
in practice these broader forums are often reduced to an active
discussion between leaders from epistemic communities, with most civil
society participants not having an opportunity to actively participate in
the discussion.
Third, in many countries, expert judges play an important role in
the development of patent case law. Review by primary judicial actors
is often a specialized form of external review. This specialization can
be realized in different ways. The views of expert judges with a
specialization in patents are generally highly regarded—though not free
from criticism by patent scholars and patent practitioners. In fact, they
are often invited as key speakers at patent conferences and
parliamentary hearings to explain recent caselaw, to comment on
potential gaps in the patent governance system, and to discuss the need
for patent reform. At these meetings they engage with members of the
epistemic communities and exchange opinions and experiences. Such
informal discussion platforms have not been accessible to the broader
civil society.
The involvement of epistemic communities has proven to be a
mixed blessing. On the one hand, such experts safeguard a level of
expertise required by the complex nature of patent law, thus helping to
guarantee high quality and efficient decision-making in the patent
policy arena. On the other hand, fears of “insider governance” and
“collective action” exist due to the continued involvement of a small
group of experts and stakeholders.
2. The Informal Dimension: The Patent Civil Society
A loosely organized patent civil society stands in contrast to the
more well-defined and powerful epistemic communities. This patent
civil society consists of what John Clark has termed “policy-influencing
civil society organizations,” such as development and human rights
NGOs, environmental and other pressure groups, trade unions,
consumer organizations, faith-based and inter-faith groups, and certain
professor organizations. 77 Examples of these organizations within the
76 Commission Public Hearing on a Future Patent Policy in Europe, COM (2006) 170 (Jul.
12, 2006), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/patent/hearing/report_en.pdf.
77 JOHN CLARK, GLOBALIZING CIVIC ENGAGEMENT: CIVIL SOCIETY AND TRANSNATIONAL
ACTION 1 (2003).
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context of patent law include the Public Patent Foundation, 78
Greenpeace, 79 Doctors without Borders, 80 Amnesty International,81
various farmer’s associations, 82 medical associations, 83 patient
groups, 84 and centers for genetic research and testing. 85
The emergence of patent civil organizations has had significant
consequences for patent law. These organizations typically adopt a
critical stance towards the overall goals of a given patent regime. For
instance, the mission statement of the Public Patent Foundation
(PUBPAT) states:
Specifically, PUBPAT works to strengthen the patent system by
introducing a healthy amount of non-patentee input to help the
system achieve high quality and balanced policies. At its core, our
work is based on the fundamental concept of protecting freedom
from illegitimate restraint. Since patents are, by nature,
government-granted restraints on freedom, every Tuesday (the day
of the week the Patent Office issues new patents) there are roughly
3,500 new things that no American is allowed to do, and there is no
fair use defense to patent infringement like with copyright and
trademark. Thus, although we do believe that a properly functioning
patent system can help a vibrant innovative economy, great care
must nonetheless be taken to avoid the negative effects that overpatenting, unmerited patenting and excessive patent rights can have
on society.
78
79

PUB. PATENT FOUNDATION, http://www.pubpat.org (last visited Aug. 25, 2010).
Patents on Life, GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL, http://www.greenpeace.org/international
/en/campaigns/agriculture/problem/genetic-engineering/ge-agriculture-and-genetic-pol/patentson-life/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2010).
80 Access to Medicines, DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS, http://www.doctorswithoutborders.
org/news/allcontent.cfm?id=84 (last visited Aug. 25, 2010).
81 Amnesty International, Amnesty International urges WTO members to respect human
rights obligations in trade negotiations in Hong Kong, AI Index: IOR 30/016/2005 (Dec. 9, 2005),
available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGIOR300162005&
lang=e.
82 Keep Out Patents on Conventional Seeds and Animals, NO PATENTS ON SEEDS,
http://www.no-patents-on-seeds.org/images/documents/the_global_appeal.pdf
(listing
the
farmer’s associations signing an open letter to the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the European
Patent Office, Government Representatives, [and] the Executive Boards of Agrobusiness
Companies).
83 Larry Storer, World Medical Associations, AMA Oppose Medical Method Patents, VEIN
THERAPY NEWS, http://veintherapynews.com/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=
109 (last visited February 7, 2011).
84 Pathologists and Patient Groups Challenge BRCA1 & BRCA2 Gene Patents in Court,
DARK DAILY, (Feb. 12, 2010), http://www.darkdaily.com/pathologists-and-patient-groups-challe
nge-brca1-brca2-gene-patents-in-court-212.
85 About Patents, Other Intellectual Property & Human Biotechnology, CENTER FOR
GENETICS AND SOCIETY, http://www.geneticsandsociety.org/section.php?id=94 (last visited
March 20, 2011).
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The best way to do that is to ensure that all of the interests affected
by the patent system, including the public interest in freedom from
unjustified restraints, are adequately represented.86

The Public Patent Foundation’s mission statement is reflective of
“patent civil society” norms in its insistence on: (1) the importance of a
“public interest” that should explicitly limit the reach of patent law; (2)
the failure of current patent norms to adequately address these issues
related to the public interest, such as, for example, broadening access to
pharmaceutical drugs; and (3) the necessity of organized actors that
seek to advance norms which can adequately address existing problems.
Notably, while the Public Patent Foundation and other NGOs view
themselves as public interest advocates, they still use standard epistemic
strategies such as inter partes examination at the USPTO and
opposition procedures at the EPO. 87
Despite the deployment of such epistemic strategies, we still claim,
however, that the patent civil society differs from more established
epistemic communities. First, while organizations, such as the Public
Patent Foundation and Greenpeace, deploy common epistemic
strategies, the emergence of novel participants that build on expertise
outside of patent law has expanded the boundaries of patent discourse.
For example, in 2009, Doctors Without Borders, whose work has
largely been in the area of international medical assistance, initiated a
campaign to pressure the nine major pharmaceutical companies to
create patent pools for new treatments in HIV/AIDs. 88 Doctors Without
Borders is representative of a “new” patent-policy participant, whose
participation draws on “expert” knowledge that is not related to the
traditional epistemic community. In doing so, Doctors Without Borders
can be seen as playing a role similar to the “expertise” actors in the
formal dimension. The “expert” role of Doctors Without Borders is
complemented by its use of aggressive advocacy strategies not typically
deployed by the traditional epistemic community. For instance, Doctors
Without Borders combined its advocacy on behalf of “patent pooling”
with an extensive letter-writing campaign to the nine major

86 About PUBPAT, PUB. PATENT FOUND, http://www.pubpat.org/About.htm (last visited
Sept. 2, 2010).
87 PUBPAT Activities, PUB. PATENT FOUND, http://www.pubpat.org/activities.htm (last
visited Sept. 2, 2010) (“PUBPAT’s primary tool for protecting the public domain is filing
requests for re-examination with the PTO.”).
88 Press Release, Doctors Without Borders, Drug Companies Called on to Pool HIV Patents
(September 30, 2009), available at http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/press/release.cfm?id=
3970&cat=press-release.
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pharmaceutical companies. 89
Second, the concerns of patent civil society groups are not always
easily translated in “common patent vocabulary” that includes such
statutory requirements as patent eligible subject matter, obviousness,
and inventive step. Therefore, many of the existent formal procedures
may prove resistant to incorporating those concerns. Mechanisms may
exist, however, that advance participation in patent-decision-making.
For example, in opposition proceedings to challenge the validity of a
given patent, members of patent civil society frequently invoke Article
53(a) of the European Patent Convention, which states that no patents
will be granted for inventions the commercial exploitation of which be
contrary to the “ordre public or morality.” 90 Article 53(a)’s explicit
commitment to “public” values allows these members of the patent civil
society to invoke inter-disciplinary public concerns in their advocacy.
Finally, addressing “public interest” concerns in patent law has
been profoundly disruptive to the settled expectations of institutional
actors and the epistemic community insofar as “public interest”
concerns often question the underlying norms of the modern patent
regime. These norms have tended to stress the importance of ownership
rights as necessary to ensure the “public interest,” in promotion of
research and development, and innovation.
III. DYNAMIC PATENT GOVERNANCE: ITS CONSEQUENCES
What are the consequences of instituting a system that incorporates
dynamic patent governance? We identify two major consequences.
First, dynamic patent governance fosters a greater fluidity between the
formal and informal dimensions of governance. Second, dynamic
patent governance has prompted an ongoing reappraisal of broader
public mechanisms within the legislative, executive and judicial nodes.
We consider each in turn.
A. Consequence One: Fluidity Between The Formal and Informal
Dimensions
A key consequence of dynamic patent governance is a more fluid
interaction between the formal and informal dimensions of the patent
89 Make it Happen Campaign Update, DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS (Oct. 7, 2009),
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.com/news/article.cfm?id=3993&cat=field-news.
90 See, e.g., G2/06 WARF/Stem Cells, [2009] E.P.O.R. 15 (EPO Enlarged Bd. App.); T0315/03 In re The President and Fellows of Harvard College/Method for Producing Transgenic
Animals (6 Jul. 2004) (EPO Bd. App.).
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governance system. We stress that dynamic patent governance differs
from other theories in that it stresses that patent governance includes
two trends—heterogeneity in the formal dimension, and a maturing
patent public in the informal dimension. These two trends feed each
other continually as various stakeholders compete at different sites
within the network to achieve their policy outcomes. In particular, the
existence of multiple primary and secondary actors can serve as a
platform where different stakeholders can try to impact policy-making
and reform.
This fluid policy environment has two noteworthy consequences.
First, a more diverse regulatory environment can be more responsive in
assessing newly identified problems within the patent context. For
instance, the Department of Agriculture and the DOJ recently held their
first workshop on competition policy in the agricultural sector. This
workshop included an analysis of patent law in the seed patent context,
91
an issue provoked by a growing “food politics” around the origins of
food production in a modern economy. 92 In the area of climate change,
the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), the EPO and the
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD)
are jointly collaborating on the development of a study that aims to
enhance understanding of the role of patents in generating access to
environmentally sound technologies. 93 This study hopes to provide
useful input into ongoing discussions on technology transfer in the
context of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC). 94
Second, a more fluid policy environment offers interested parties
(whether in the epistemic or patent civil society) a wider range of
diverse administrative levers. An important example of such an
expansion of participation in the patent system is the use of citizen
petitions under Section 505(Q) of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act, 95 which in its implementing regulations 96 provides that any person
91 Press Release, Department of Justice, DOJ and USDA Hold First-Ever Workshop on
Competition Issues in Agriculture (March 12, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/publi
c/press_releases/2010/256496.htm.
92 Michael Pollan, The Food Movement, Rising, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, (June 10, 2010) (book
review), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/jun/10/food-movement-rising/?paginati
on=false.
93 Press Release, European Patent Office, EPO, UNEP and ICTSD to work on green patent
study (Apr. 27, 2009), available at http://www.epo.org/news-issues/news/2009/20090427.html.
94 Id.
95 21 U.S.C. § 355(q) (2010) (allowing for the submission of citizen petitions within the
context of the submission of generic pharmaceutical drugs).
96 21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (2011) (outlining guidelines for submission of citizen petitions within
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can submit a good-faith petition 97 in response to the submission of a
generic drug application. The ability to participate in agency decisionmaking at all stages is notably limited within the context of
administrative patent decision-making, although recent experiments,
such as the peer-to-patent system, and the ability for third parties to file
observations or statements at the EPO, 98 may provide interesting
avenues for public participation.
B. Consequence Two: Reappraising the Public’s Role in Formal
Dimensions
The second consequence of dynamic patent governance is a
reappraisal of the public’s role in decision-making. In particular, as
primary and secondary actors serve as “nodes” at the different decisionmaking points, a key question at each node will be how to determine the
best method for public participation. Thus, dynamic patent governance
has begun to prompt a reappraisal of how the public can participate in
patent decision-making at each respective node.
1. Consequences at the Legislative Node
As we discuss, infra, the legislative “node” has emerged as a key
forum in the current patent regime. The legislative process in the patent
context is subject to a number of key pressures (such as temporal and
ideological uncertainty). But its greatest danger is that legislators may
yield to intense interest group pressure, with variable outcomes that
often do not take broader “public interest” values into consideration.
For instance, Jay Kesan and Andreas Gallo claim that patent reform
efforts in the United States have been dominated by a group of what
they term “inventors’ ‘pressure groups’,” 99 which include individual
inventors, universities, big-sector-based corporations and small-sectorbased corporations. 100 The dominance of the “inventive” community at
the expense of other potential societal interests risks the use of the
the context of generic pharmaceutical drug provisions).
97 Gerald F. Masoudi, Legal Developments in the Enforcement of Food and Drug Law, 63
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 585, 588-89 (2008) (outlining the inclusion of citizen petition verification
procedures under Section 505(q) of the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of
2007).
98 European Patent Convention, supra note 44, art. 115.
99 Jay Kesan & Andres Gallos, The Political Economy of the Patent System, 87 N.C. L. REV.
1341, 1352–54 (2009).
100 Id. at 1353. Kesan and Gallos divide the corporate inventor interest into four categories:
(1) “Big IT;” (2) “Big Pharma and Biotech companies;” (3) “Small IT;” and (4) “Small Pharma
and Biotech Companies.” Id.

MURRAY-ZIMMEREN_TO_IZRAILEV_19.2

316

CARDOZO J. OF INT’L & COMP. LAW

4/18/2011 4:49:00 PM

[Vol. 19:287

legislative process as a method to intensify certain inequities within the
pre-existing patent regime. In particular, it may strengthen the tendency
of politicians to over-rely on epistemic communities at the expense of
other viable civil society stakeholders. Full reliance on a small group of
patent law experts for patent policy-making and patent law
harmonization has the potential to lead to serious democratic deficits in
patent policymaking.
The revival of the legislative actor, in a crucial role, then, raises
one key question: are there effective methods for including a wide range
of actors who represent a broad set of inventive interest groups, or
further the goals of the traditional epistemic community? Patent law
reform in the United States has not offered any significant innovation in
this respect. Patent law reform has followed the usual template for
legislative decision-making in the United States, with limited
opportunities for testimony before legislative sub-committees, as well as
closed negotiations between key legislators, such as Senators Patrick
Leahy and Orrin Hatch. 101
Patent reform in Europe, however, has used a broader range of
consultative processes to address a more varied set of public interests.
Europe has used several methods to allow for the involvement of a
critical layer of citizens. First, the European Parliament (EP) has
employed the traditional method of having a comprehensive study from
independent experts 102 preceded 103 and followed 104 by workshops in
order to inform discussion in the EP. There are two issues that deserve
some more attention.
First, this study explicitly included a
reconsideration of the governance of the European Patent System. 105
101 William L. Warren, Patent Law Reform in the Works Again: Third Time Could be the
Charm for Legislative Efforts that Benefit Investors and Job Growth, GENETIC ENGINEERING
AND BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS, May 1, 2010, http://www.genengnews.com/
gen-articles/patent-law-reform-in-the-works-again/3271.
102 ROBIN COWAN ET AL., EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, SCIENTIFIC TECHNOLOGY OPTIONS
ASSESSMENT: POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM
(Sept. 2007), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/stoa/publications/studies/stoa16_en.pdf.
103 Before the draft of the report, a workshop was organized on November 9, 2006, where
several independent experts and stakeholders were invited to present policy options and debate
them with members of the EP and the expert working group. See STOA Workshop on Policy
Options for the European Patent System, THE DANISH BOARD OF TECHNOLOGY (Nov. 22, 2006),
http://www.tekno.dk/subpage.php3?article=1345&language=uk&category=11&toppic=kategori1
1.’s
104 After the final draft of the report, a second workshop was organized on June 14, 2007 to
discuss the findings of the expert working group, where the working group presented the report
and discussed it with members of the EP and the audience. See STOA Workshop: Policy Options
for the Improvement of the European Patent System, http://www.tekno.dk/pdf/projekter/patentsystem STOA/p07_STOA_Patent_Workshop_Programme.pdf.
105 At the first workshop, two well-known patent governance scholars were invited: Peter
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Though the recommendations of the working group on governance
issues were limited and focused primarily on transparency and
information exchange on patent policy, the initiative to put patent
governance on the agenda is nevertheless welcome. Second, compared
to the limited opportunities for testimony during hearings before the
U.S. Congress—in theory—anyone interested in these workshops could
have attended, and there were many opportunities for the general
audience to be heard. Unfortunately, in practice, the number of
participants from the patent civil society and the number of members of
the EP attending the workshops was relatively limited. The second
method employed by the European Union is that the European
Commission, which has the ability to propose legislation in the form of
directives or regulations, can initiate a consultation combined with a
public hearing, where all interested civil society groups can be
represented. In January 2006, the European Commission began this
process and launched a consultation on the patent system in Europe. 106
It received over 2500 107 responses which were closely studied and
summarized, and which were decisive during discussion of topics at the
public hearing. At the hearing, about forty pre-selected stakeholders
were invited to give their views, and the members of the audience could
also comment. 108 Third, the EPO undertook a significant, strategic,
forward thinking, planning process that consulted a wide range of
academics and other patent administrators using different so-called
“scenarios.” 109 While the EPO does not pursue a legislative agenda, its
Drahos and Ingrid Schneider. Peter Drahos presented the theoretical model of network
governance and its application in the patent system. Peter Drahos, Dir., Ctr. for Governance of
Knowledge and Dev. Regulatory Inst’s. Network, Austl. Nat’1 Univ., Governance of the
European Patent System: A Separation of Powers Approach (Nov. 9, 2006), http://www.tekno.dk
/pdf/projekter/patent-system-STOA/Drahos.pdf. Though the working group did include a short
analysis of network governance and the informal and informal dimension, in our opinion the
recommendations drawn from the model were limited. See ROBIN COWAN, ET AL., supra note
102, at 34-36.
106 European Commission Questionnaire On the Patent System in Europe (Jan. 9, 2006),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/patent/consult_en.pdf.
107 Commission Public Hearing on a Future Patent Policy in Europe, supra note 76.
108 Id.
109 EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE (2007), http://documents.epo
.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/63A726D28B589B5BC12572DB00597683/$File/EPO_scenar
ios_bookmarked.pdf (June 2007). Scenario development is widely used in policy planning when
organizations wish to test strategies against uncertain future developments to understand different
ways that future events might unfold. See generally Paul Schoemaker, Multiple Scenario
Development: Its Conceptual and Behavioral Foundation, 14 STRATEGIC MGMT J. 195-96
(1994). The scenarios were presented to constitute plausible, relevant and challenging stories
about possible future developments with respect to the global patent system. EUROPEAN PATENT
OFFICE, SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 109, at 1. The issues examined by the

MURRAY-ZIMMEREN_TO_IZRAILEV_19.2

318

CARDOZO J. OF INT’L & COMP. LAW

4/18/2011 4:49:00 PM

[Vol. 19:287

use of “scenarios” may also be an interesting approach for legislators
that consider reforms.
Thus, the efforts in Europe offer interesting lessons on a broader
set of methods that could be used to conduct patent reform within the
legislative node. 110 First, the heterogeneity of the institutions involved
in writing patent regulations and creating policy; such as the EPO, the
European Commission, the EP, and the Council of the European Union,
has valuably led to the development of a more experimental culture
which is better suited to use public participation mechanisms in
attempts to reform the patent system. Second, due to the broader range
of public interests involved in the reform process in Europe, reform
efforts in Europe can be seen as more “forward-looking” and less
reactionary than similar attempts in the United States. Nevertheless, the
legitimacy of the European initiatives is also open to criticism. In a
narrow sense, some of the consultative projects, like the EPO’s
Scenarios Project, still primarily rely on the traditional epistemic
community, and accordingly provide for weak interaction with a wider
spectrum of stakeholders. In a broader sense, the European Union’s
legislative experimentation with the involvement of more stakeholders
may create a significant risk that patent policymaking is subject to
decision paralysis in light of greater democratic participation. The
consultation procedure that delivered over 2500 responses illustrates
this point. The only way to effectively overcome this is to engage
sufficient manpower and manage the process with clear deadlines to
deal efficiently with stakeholder feedback. Therefore, at the workshop
that followed the consultation procedure a number of representative
stakeholders were pre-selected and had to be extremely brief and
concise in their comments. 111
European Patent Office cover broad policy questions: “How might IP regimes evolve by 2025?”
and “What global legitimacy might such regimes have?” Id. The European Patent Office’s
“Scenarios for the Future” report aimed at encouraging strategic conversation among a wide
range of stakeholders. Id. The document was written in lay terms in order to reach a wide
audience. Four scenarios are presented: Market Rules (business), Whose Game? (geopolitical),
Trees of Knowledge (societal) and Blue Skies (technological). Id. They were developed by the
European Patent Office scenario builders, but they reflect—as far as possible—different
perspectives obtained through interviews. Id.
110 See Ingrid Schneider, Can Patent Legislation Make A Difference? Bring Parliaments and
Civil Society into Patent Governance?, in POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
CONTESTATION OVER THE OWNERSHIP, USE AND CONTROL OF KNOWLEDGE 129-57 (Sebastian
Haunss & Kenneth Shadlen eds., 2011) (examining the effect of the European governance process
on the inclusion of a broader civil society).
111 Indeed, an examination of the agenda for the public hearing demonstrates a substantial
number of scheduled speeches and presentations. See Public Hearing: Speechs and PPT
Presentations, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Sept. 1, 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_
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2. Consequences at the Administrative Node
Dynamic patent governance has had two key consequences within
the context of the executive node. First, like their legislative
counterparts, primary examining agencies have begun to engage in
significant experimentation as to widening institutionalized access for
third party participation in patent decision-making, in light of the
increasing demand for greater decision-making accountability. Second,
examining agencies have begun to compete with secondary actors in
launching relevant policy initiatives within the patent regime.
Examining agencies have experimented with a variety of
participatory mechanisms. At the most basic level, examining agencies
have begun to strengthen their “transparency” mechanisms that provide
access to information about the issuance of patents and their associated
procedures. These transparency mechanisms have taken a variety of
different forms. First, agencies have strengthened formal “publication”
requirements as to the application and their relevant prosecutions. In
particular, agencies have strengthened access to the files associated with
the entire prosecution process, as well as the opinions issued by
examiners and internal reviewers. This has prompted a significant
empirical assessment of patent practice. Second, agencies have
experimented with “informal” transparency mechanisms. For example,
in 2010 the USPTO, under the leadership of the current commissioner
David Kappos, started a blog by agency officials that aims to provide
greater transparency to the regulated public. 112 This practice was
“copied” by the EPO in 2011. 113 Moreover, the USPTO initiated
another informal “transparency” mechanism, the Ombudsman Pilot
Program, which is designed to enhance the application process for
patentees by providing assistance for problems that may arise during
prosecution. 114 This new tool could become even more relevant if the
Ombudsman Program could not only assist applicants but also make
itself available for feedback from the public on a broader range of
issues.
Agencies have also tested strengthened “deliberative” mechanisms
that include “open” third-party participation at the initial stage of review

market/indprop/patent/hearing_speeches_en.htm.
112 Director’s Forum: David Kappos’ Public Blog, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
http://www.uspto.gov/blog/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2011).
113 The President of the European Patent Office also launched a blog. See, e.g., President’s
Blog, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE (Apr. 05, 2011), http://blog.epo.org/?banner=homepage.
114 Ombudsman Pilot Program, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/
patents/ombudsman.jsp (last visited Feb. 26, 2011).
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of a patent. While many examining agencies permit third parties to
participate in review of a patent, it is often in a somewhat “closed”
manner that is limited to an observational role. For example, at the
EPO, third parties may present observations concerning the patentability
of a published European application. 115 Moreover, they can present
written statements during the course of proceedings before the Board of
Appeal. 116 However, no certainty exists that these statements will
influence the outcome of the application, as the Board can address these
statements as it thinks fit. 117 In practice, the Board generally takes such
observations into consideration.
Recent innovations, however, have sought to create “open”
participation by third parties in the examination of the patent itself.
Stakeholder participation is at the core of the community patent review
(CPR) pilot projects in Japan 118 and the “peer to patent” pilot at the
USPTO. 119 These projects invite the scientific community to provide
comments on patent applications (e.g., through patent Wikis), for the
purpose of creating an open review process for patent prior art.
Notably, while both sets of mechanisms are most likely to be used by
the traditional epistemic communities, as a result of these changes they
can now be used by any participant, and thus, are not predicated upon
such epistemic participation.
The innovations adopted by the examining agencies may be a
response to the second consequence of dynamic patent governance at
the executive level: the competition of secondary actors to conduct
relevant policy initiatives within the patent regime. The rise of
secondary actors can be attributed to the failure or lack of power of
examining agencies to respond to the arguments of various patent
activist networks.
Secondary agencies can be more responsive in two significant

115
116

European Patent Convention, supra note 44, art. 115(1).
Decision of the Administrative Council of 7 December 2006 Approving Amendments to
the Rules of Procedure of the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office, art.
11b(1), 2007 O.J. EPO 303, 308, http://archive.epo.org/epo/pubs/oj007/05_07/05_3037.pdf.
117 Id.
118 TOKKYOCHƿ [JAPAN PATENT OFFICE (JPO)], KOMYUNITEI PATENTO REBYU NI KANSU RU
CHOUSAKENKYUU [RESEARCH ON COMMUNITY PATENT REVIEW] (2010), http://www.jpo.go.jp/s
hiryou/toushin/chousa/zaisanken.htm#2001. The latest developments associated with this project
are referred to as “peer to patent Japan.” Peer to Patent Japan (P2PJ), INST. OF INTELL. PROP
(2009), http://www.iip.or.jp/e/e_p2pj/.
119 For more information on the USPTO’s pilot project, see Peer to Patent: Community Patent
Review, PEER TO PATENT, http://www.peertopatent.org (last visited Aug. 10, 2010). See also
Beth S. Noveck, “Peer to Patent:” Collective Intelligence, Open Review, and Patent Reform, 20
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123 (2006).
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ways. First, secondary actors can be more responsive in their
ideological functions. For example, acting in their expertise capacity,
authorities in charge of monitoring competition in the market have
viewed settlement agreements between pharmaceutical and generic
competitors and patent clusters quite skeptically. 120 Second, secondary
actors can offer additional amenable avenues for public participation, in
order to respond to pressure from the patent community.
IV. DYNAMIC PATENT GOVERNANCE: THE MYRIAD EXAMPLE
We have proposed a complex model for new patent governance,
but its real measure as an effective model is based on its usefulness as a
way to explain the complex reality underlying the current patent regime.
We believe that—although this case is already widely discussed as to its
merits—the Myriad debates in the United States and Europe are
particularly useful in demonstrating the emerging contours of patent
governance in two key respects. Initially, the Myriad debates in both
jurisdictions offer sharp contrasts in how to successfully incorporate the
maturing patent civil society into patent governance. Furthermore, the
Myriad debates offer an example of how to manage ongoing
heterogeneity within the institutional design of the formal dimension of
patent law.
A. The Myriad Example, Lesson One: A Maturing Patent Civil Society
Needs “Doors” to Knock On
The Myriad debates will be remembered as instrumental in the
assessment of how a maturing patent civil society can participate in
patent decision-making in a dynamic civil society, (in both the United
States and Europe). Indeed, a comparative assessment reveals that
interest groups in Europe effectively participated in challenging the
Myriad patents far earlier than in the United States. In the United States
the available formal methods for third-party participation are more
limited than in Europe. Therefore, ongoing participation in patent
decision-making is far less certain. In both jurisdictions, an interesting
tension has emerged between the availability of third-party review at the
internal administrative review stage and a subsequent invalidity review
at the external review stage.
In Europe, the controversy regarding Myriad’s patents started
early. In 2002, three patents based on the genes BRCA1 and BRCA2121
120
121

See e.g., Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, supra note 64.
European Patent No. 0705902 (BRCA1) (filed Aug. 11, 1995); European Patent No.
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and a fourth patent, 122 relating to a method for diagnosing breast and
ovarian cancer were granted to Myriad Genetics. In response, a wide
variety of stakeholders 123 launched an opposition proceeding under
Article 99 of the EPC, and an appeal under Article 106 of the EPC. As
a result of these proceedings, the scope of all patents has been
significantly reduced. For instance, European Patent No. 0699754, on a
method for diagnosing a predisposition for breast and ovarian cancer,
which covered a broad variety of methods and mutations, now only
covers a diagnostic method for a specific type of mutation, namely
“frameshift mutations.” 124
The outcome of the Myriad debates in Europe offers some crucial
lessons as to why the role of the civil society (as opposed to a more

0705903 (BRCA1) (filed Aug. 11, 1995); European Patent No. 0785216 (BRCA2) (filed Dec. 17,
1996). See generally Bibliographic Data: EP 0785216 (A1), EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE,
http://worldwide.espacenet.com/publicationDetails/biblio?DB=EPODOC&adjacent=true&locale
=en_T1&FT=D&date=19970723&CC=EP&NR=0785216A1&KC=A1 (last updated Apr. 04,
2011). European Patent No. 0705902 related to “Nucleic acid probes comprising a fragment of
the 17q-linked breast and ovarian cancer susceptibility gene” and was granted on 11/28/2001;
opposition was filed in August 2002; appeal against the decision in opposition was filed on
11/15/2005 (T1213/05) but was rejected on 09/27/2007. The patent is maintained as amended in
opposition. Id. European Patent No. 0705903 related to “Mutations in the 17q-linked breast and
ovarian cancer susceptibility gene” and was granted on 05/23/2001; opposition was filed in
February 2002; an appeal was lodged on 08/01/2005 (T0666/05) and led to a considerable
limitation of the scope of the patent (11/14/2008). Id. European Patent No. 0785216 related to
“Chromosome 13-linked breast cancer susceptibility gene BRCA2” and was granted on
01/08/2003; opposition was filed on 10/08/2003 and led to the decision that the patent will be
maintained in amended form (B2 New Specification of the European patent on 06/07/2006). Id.
For more information also see SmartSearch, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, https://register.epoline.
org/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) (providing a search tool to find information about patents
registered with the European Patent Office).
122 European Patent No. 0699754 (BRCA1). European Patent No. 0699754 related to a
“Method for diagnosing a predisposition for breast and ovarian cancer” and was granted on
10/01/2001; opposition was filed in October 2001; appeal against the decision in opposition was
filed on 01/14/2005 (T0080/05). See EP 0699754 – Method for Diagnosing a Predisposition for
Breast and Ovarian Cancer, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, https://register.epo.org/espacenet/applic
ation?number=EP95305602&tab=main (last visited Apr. 10, 2011). In opposition the patent was
revoked, but in the appeal initiated by the applicant, the European Patent Office allowed the
applicant to reformulate the invention resulting in an amendment of the original patent, which
now only covers a diagnostic method for a specific type of mutation, namely frameshift
mutations. Id.
123 Some important stakeholders who participated in the initial Myriad disputes were e.g. the
State of The Netherlands (in particular, its Department of Health, Welfare and Sports), Institut
Curie, Assistance Publique-Hopitaux de Paris, Institut Gustave Roussy-IGR, Associazione
Angelaserra per la Ricerca sul Cancro, the Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz (SP Schweiz),
Greenpeace, a number of individuals (die Erben von Herrn Dr. Wilhelms, Rolf E.), the Belgian
Society of Human Genetics, and the “Vereniging van Stichtingen Klinische Genetica. See supra
note 121; see also supra note 122.
124 European Patent No. 0699754 (filed Oct. 2001).
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narrowly focused epistemic community) has emerged in Europe. The
internal opposition and appeal procedures of the EPC are structured so
that “any” person may challenge the validity of a patent on broad
terms. 125 Thus, the internal administrative review of the EPC provides
European “patent civil society” with the opportunity to participate in
patent policy-making. Additionally, at this internal administrative
review stage, the Myriad experience demonstrated that patent civil
society is increasingly comfortable with the use of epistemic tactics.
These relevant groups focused on the general patentability requirements
(novelty and inventive step) in their challenge to the patents issued by
the EPO, thus demonstrating that within Europe, these civil society
advocacy groups are not limited by the complexity and technicality of
patent law and use the available “epistemic” tools to fight controversial
patents.
Achieving goals through external review of patents, though, has
not been as simple in Europe. After the patent grant or the maintenance
of the patent—potentially in amended form—the opportunity to
challenge the patents in invalidity procedures before national courts
remains open. However, the only opportunity to challenge a patent is to
undertake external review of a patent in each individual member state of
the European Patent Organization where the patent has been validated.
This prompts a risk that different national courts will come to different
conclusions as to the validity of each given patent. A number of groups,
active in the EPO opposition proceedings, have suggested initiating
invalidity proceedings on the national level in order to address the
uncertain state of validity of the Myriad patents. 126 Apart from this
uncertainty at the national level due to the institutional framework of the
European Patent Organization, at least two national courts have referred
preliminary questions 127 to the European Union Court of Justice in two
cases relating to the EU Biotechnology Directive. This directive
harmonizes the grant of patents in the biotech sector and has been

125 Id. art. 107 (“Any party to proceedings adversely affected by the decision may appeal.”);
European Patent Convention, supra note 44, art. 99 (“Within nine months of the publication of
the mention of the grant of the European patent in the European Patent Bulletin, any person may
give notice to the European Patent Office of opposition to that patent, in accordance with the
Implementing Regulations.”).
126 Correspondence between the authors and G. Matthijs, Professor of the Faculty of Medicine
and Head of the Laboratory for Molecular Diagnosis, Department of Human Genetics, The
University of Leuven (Jan. 2010) (on file with authors). G. Matthijs has been heavily involved in
the European opposition proceedings on behalf of the Belgian Society of Human Genetics.
127 Case C-34/10, Brüstle v. Greenpeace (pending); Case C-428/08, Monsanto Tech. LLC v.
Cefetra BV et al., 2011 F.S.R. 6.
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incorporated into the EPC implementing rules. 128 Even though these
preliminary questions do not directly relate to human gene patents, the
preliminary rulings may create momentum to re-open the debate on the
desirability of gene patents in general.
By contrast, when compared to Europe, the experience of patent
civil society in the United States still remains underdeveloped. It was
not until May 2009 that any significant challenge to the Myriad patents
emerged. Members of the patent civil society were unable to utilize
internal administrative avenues such as the current Patent Act to
challenge the Myriad patents, because third parties are unable to oppose
the grant of a patent under U.S. law (as was the case in Europe). 129
The Myriad debate commenced as an invalidity challenge brought
by the American Civil Liberties Union and the Public Patent Foundation
at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, along with a number of
other plaintiffs (individual patients, patient groups, physicians,
academic researchers and medical societies). 130 These plaintiffs filed a
complaint, claiming in part that isolated nucleic acids are not patentable
subject matter, as they are products of nature and thus contrary to 35
U.S.C. § 101, which specifies what constitutes eligible subject matter
under the Patent Act of 1952. 131 On March 29, 2010 (with an amended
opinion issued on April 5, 2010), the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York held that the composition and method
claims directed to DNA molecules possessing nucleotide sequences that
translate BRCA1 and BRCA2 proteins are “products of nature” 132 or
“abstract ideas” under Section 101 of the Patent Act. 133
While the substantive holding of Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v.
USPT has been widely reported,134 an earlier denial of a motion to
dismiss, which granted standing to the “public interest” plaintiffs, is of
equal importance. In its decision to deny the motion to dismiss, 135 the

128 Directive 98/44/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the
Legal Protection of Biotechnical Inventions, arts. 1, 5, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13 (EU).
129 U.S. patent law does not encompass an opposition procedure. The closest equivalent to the
European opposition procedure, is the inter partes reexamination procedure in U.S. patent law.
However, the grounds for reexamination are more limited than those in European opposition
proceedings.
130 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F.Supp.2d 181 (S.D.N.Y 2010), as
amended (Apr 05, 2010).
131 Id.; 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
132 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 237-38.
133 Id.
134 See, e.g., Danny Thompson, Myriad Genetics Can’t Patent a Human Gene, SLATE (Apr. 7,
2010, 11:34 AM), http:///www.slate.com/id/2250082/.
135 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 669 F.Supp.2d 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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district court held that the plaintiffs had standing because: (1) the
statutory scheme of the Patent Act did not divest the plaintiffs of
standing to pursue their constitutional claims; 136 (2) the plaintiffs
suffered a fairly traceable injury because Myriad had refused to license
its patents; 137 and (3) the plaintiffs’ injury could be redressed because
the policies of the USPTO led to the unwarranted issuance of the
patents at issue. 138 This is a significant shift from previous precedent
that suggested that the statutory scheme of the Patent Act precluded any
judicial relief associated with the USPTO’s issuance of a patent. 139 The
outcome of the Myriad case, in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPT,
indicates the success of a maturing U.S. patent civil society, and the
potential to expand access to judicial review by building a creditable
case for standing.The intense interest in Myriad demonstrates a desire to
create a patent law amenable to the claims of interests beyond those of
the patentee and its direct competitors. The ongoing interest in Myriad
is also evinced by the unlikely set of parties that submitted amicus
curiae briefs in the Myriad appeal currently before the Federal Circuit.
The unlikely allies that submitted supportive briefs included the Cancer
Council of Australia, 140 the American Medical Association,141
Universities Allied for Essential Medicines, 142 Friends of the Earth,143
136 Id. at 385. The plaintiffs were also able to survive a challenge to the district court’s
exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction because the court determined that their claim was valid
because federal district courts exercise subject-matter jurisdiction in “all civil actions arising
under the Constitution.” Id. at 382. Such a claim was possible because the Patent Act contained
no remedy for the violation of constitutional rights that had accompanied the issuance of the
disputed patents. Id. at 383. This holding was significant in light of precedent that emphasized
that the statutory scheme of the Patent Act precluded the exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Id. It should be noted that the court did not address how an issuance of a patent can lead to an
unconstitutional result. See id.
137 Id. at 385.
138 Id.
139 See, e.g., Syntex (U.S.A.) Inc. v. USPTO, 882 F.2d 1570, 1572-74 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(statutory scheme of the Patent Act precluded a private judicial remedy for statutory violations by
the USPTO).
140 Brief for Cancer Council Australia and Luigi Palombi as Amici Curiae Supporting
Affirmance, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F.Supp.2d 181 (S.D.N.Y 2010),
appeal docketed, No. 2010-1406 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 29, 2010), 2010 WL 5306807.
141 Brief for American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs Appellees and Arguing for Affirmance, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F.Supp.2d
181 (S.D.N.Y 2010), appeal docketed, No. 2010-1406 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 6, 2010), 2010 WL
5306806
142 Brief for Universities Allied for Essential Medicines as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellees, Supporting Affirmance, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702
F.Supp.2d 181 (S.D.N.Y 2010), appeal docketed, No. 2010-1406 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 20, 2011), 2011
WL 585708.
143 Brief for the International Center of Technology Assessment et al. as Amicus Curiae in
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the March of Dimes Foundation, 144 the American Association of
Retired Persons, 145 the Southern Baptist Convention, 146 and the
National Women Health Network. 147 The number and broad range of
parties that submitted briefs in support of the decision of the district
court not only evinces the important legal and factual questions Myriad
presents as to the scope of Section 101, but also its status as a case that
demonstrates the increasingly diverse participation of patent civil
society.
Nevertheless, the ongoing appeal of this decision (on all grounds),
creates uncertainty as to the ultimate impact of Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. USPT, and indicates the limits of creditable patent civil
society opposition in the United States. This is especially true in light
of the uphill battle that patent civil society still faces in establishing
standing before the Federal Circuit. 148 This contrasts sharply with
recent developments in Europe, where the ability of third parties to
broadly challenge patents has proven to be a useful tool in
administrative level opposition and appellate proceedings.
B. The Myriad Example, Lesson Two: Managing the Heterogeneity
“Thicket”
The Myriad example also highlights how the increasing
heterogeneity of the formal dimension in patent law has transformed the
policymaking landscape. Notably, the questions at stake in cases such
as Myriad—the patenting of gene patents and their associated testing
regimes—raise significant ethical and public health concerns. These
concerns have prompted secondary agencies, with expertise in these
Support of Plaintiff-Appellees, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F.Supp.2d 181
(S.D.N.Y 2010), appeal docketed, No. 2010-1406 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 20, 2011), 2011 WL 585709.
144 Brief for Amici Curiae Canavan Foundation et al. in Support of Plaintiffs for Affirmance,
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F.Supp.2d 181 (S.D.N.Y 2010), appeal docketed,
No. 2010-1406 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 20, 2011), 2011 WL 585710.
145 Brief for AARP as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Arguing for
Affirmance, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F.Supp.2d 181 (S.D.N.Y 2010),
appeal docketed, No. 2010-1406 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 20, 2011), 2011 WL 585711.
146 Brief for the Southern Baptist Convention as Amicus Curiae in Support of PlaintiffsAppellees and Arguing for Affirmance, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F.Supp.2d
181 (S.D.N.Y 2010), appeal docketed, No. 2010-1406 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 20, 2011), 2011 WL
585712.
147 Brief of Amici Curiae [of] the National Women’s Health Network et al. in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellees, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F.Supp.2d 181 (S.D.N.Y
2010), appeal docketed, No. 2010-1406 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 20, 2011), 2011 WL 598420.
148 Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 925-932 (1991)(limiting standing to
for a variety of interest groups that sought to challenge an administrative determination of the
USPTO under the Patent Act and the Administrative Procedure Act).
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areas, to assert their competence. For instance, in 2002 the United
States Secretary of Health and Human Services established the
Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health and Society
(SACGHS) to examine “current patent policy and licensing practices for
their impact on access to genetic technologies.” 149 The membership of
the Committee has to include at least two members who “shall be
specifically selected for their knowledge of consumer issues and
concerns and the view and perspectives of the general public.” 150 In
April 2010, the Committee composed of fourteen members, published
its final report on patent licensing and genetic testing, which included
recommendations that would: (1) support the creation of exemptions for
infringement in the case of diagnostic testing; (2) promote the
adherence to norms of access in genetic testing; (3) suggest more
transparency in genetic testing licensing; (4) establish an advisory body
on the health impacts of genetic patents and provide expertise to the
USPTO on genetic testing issues; and (5) ensure equitable patient
access to clinically useful genetic tests. 151 In response, Kathleen
Sebelius, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, issued a
restrained statement on July 2, 2010, which emphasized the
commitment of the United States in maintaining “a competitive position
in life science research and development.” 152 In a curious move,
Secretary Sebelius then dismantled the Committee in October 2010. 153
The Committee’s designated responsibilities and its ultimate report
indicates how heterogeneous forums for patent policymaking can be
useful in questioning general assumptions underlying patent law and the
impact of patent law in particular fields. Such forums have a designated
objective that is intersectional in nature. This intersectional focus can
shift the ideological conception of patent law into new directions by
incorporating diverse policy rationales. In its report, SACGHS

149 Establishment of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health and Society, 67
Fed. Reg. 65, 126 (October 23, 2002).
150 67 Fed. Reg. at 127.
151 SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH AND POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERV’S., LICENSING PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT ACCESS TO
GENETIC TESTS 4-6 (2010), http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/reports/SACGHS_patents_report_
2010.pdf (including at least one dissent and abstention).
152 Letter from Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., to Steven Teutsch,
Chairman of the Sec’y’s Advisory Comm. on Genetics, Health and Pol’y (July 2, 2010),
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/reports/Secretarys%20letter%20to%20%20SACGHS%20on%0
Patents%20Report.pdf.
153 E-Mail from SACGHS [Sec’y’s Advisory Comm. on Genetics, Health and Pol’y]
(NIH/OD/OSP), to Daniel Vorhaus, (Sept. 27, 2010, 3:08 PM EST), http://www.genomicslawrep
ort.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/SACHGS-Email.pdf.
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emphasized the importance of ongoing research, ethical and public
health rationales, which offered a distinctly critical viewpoint of
traditional patent norms. 154 Therefore, we believe the potential
utilization of actors such as SACGHS to advise the USPTO
demonstrates a commitment to changing the debate over gene patents
by broadening the institutional competence of other agencies to address
the issues associated with gene patents. An organization such as
SACGHS can hence function as an alternative super-structural node
within the dynamic patent governance context. The question of
institutional competence to address issues related to the public interest
may continue to foster a heterogeneous and dynamic interrelated
landscape in the patent governance system. The emergence of
heterogeneous administrative forums in the United States appears in
many respects to be a positive development for patent governance, as
diverse ideological and institutional conceptions of the public interest
are likely to be generated.
By contrast, the policy tension over the relevant ideological issues
at stake in Myriad demonstrates the ways in which the heterogeneity of
the administrative landscape is much more complicated for patent
governance in Europe. Within the European context, the heterogeneity
of institutions with conflicting policy goals may lead to difficulties in
ascertaining who has the institutional competence to address the policy
issues at stake in Myriad. The patent system of the European Union
differs from the United States patent governance system, among other
things, in that the European patent system consists of two independent
institutional pillars: the European Patent Organization (including the
EPO and the Administrative Council), on the one hand, and the
European Union, on the other hand. The EPO retains its own ability to
make significant policy choices during the grant and issuance of a given
patent, along with the broader power of its Administrative Council to
issue and amend regulations that implement the basic treaty
provisions. 155 Policy governance is further complicated by the fact that
the European Union (through the legislative procedures set for the
European Commission, Council of the European Union and the
European Parliament), also has power, to a certain extent, to issue
regulations and directives that reflect its priorities. For instance,
European Commission has been working towards the regulation of a
154

SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH AND POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
HUMAN SERV’S., supra 151, at 72-85 (discussing multiple legal frameworks for the
assessment of genetic testing).
155 European Patent Convention, supra note 44, art. 33.
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unitary EU patent for a long. 156
An additional consideration for the European Union is the proper
functioning of its internal market in order to prevent trade barriers that
may arise as a result of legal action taken in various Member States.
Indeed, in 1998 the European Union issued its Biotechnology Directive,
which sought to harmonize how each of its Member States protected
biotechnological inventions. The European Union directed its Member
States to protect biotechnological inventions, including isolated gene
sequences. 157 It is notable, that—although the EPO is not formally
bound by EU legislation—the Directive has explicitly been incorporated
into the EPC 158 and now provides the EPO with more detailed
guidelines with regard to the patenting of biotechnological
inventions. 159 Finally, the Court of Justice of the European Union has
begun to assert its own role in shaping the policy landscape of the
European Union through its review of the parameters of the EU
Biotechnology Directive in Monsanto. 160
Thus, in many respects, the example of Myriad, and the related
debates over the scope of gene patenting in the European Union, reveal
the potential for a “heterogeneity thicket:” the existence of so many
administrative actors that stakeholders may not be able to ascertain how
to approach the various policies instituted by these actors. 161 Indeed,
the European Society of Human Genetics (ESHG), one of the primary
critics of the approval of the Myriad patents in Europe, has stressed that
the “heterogeneity thicket” remains an important public policy concern
in the European Union, noting that:
In many countries, patent issues are dealt by the Ministry of Justice,
even though the consequences affect the Ministry of Health. This
dilemma represents the origin of some of the identified problems in
this report. Discussion between these ministries is necessary.

156 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision Authorizing Enhanced
Cooperation in the Area of the Creation of Unitary Patent Protection, COM (2010) 0790 final
(Dec. 14, 2010).
157 Directive 98/44/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the
Legal Protection of Biotechnical Inventions, supra note 128, art. 5.
158 Implementing Regulations to the Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Dec. 13,
2006, pt. II, ch. V, r. 26(1) (“Directive 98/44/EC of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of
biotechnological inventions shall be used as a supplementary means of interpretation.”).
159 T-272/95 In re Howard Florey Inst. of Experimental Physiology and Med. (23 Oct. 2002)
(EPO Bd. App.), http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/pdf/t950272eu2.pdf.
160 See supra note 127.
161 See S. Aymé, G. Matthijs, & S. Soini, Patenting and Licensing, in Genetic Testing:
Recommendations of the European Soc’y of Human Genetics, 16 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS S3
(2008).
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A better separation between the courts (such as the proposed
European Patent Court) and the EPO is desirable, notably
considering that EPO is at present not formally accountable to any
other body in the EU. 162

The ESHG’s recommendation illuminates the dilemma of
European patent heterogeneity, insofar as its structure has yet to find an
optimal balance between centralization and diversity. Indeed, this is
unlikely to change anytime soon as the latest proposals for a centralized
European and EU Patent Court have been stalled, (temporarily), by the
EU Court of Justice 163 because of their incompatibility with the EU
Treaty and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU).
V. THE CHALLENGES OF DYNAMIC PATENT GOVERNANCE
We have outlined the contours of dynamic network governance in
patent law, and considered its real-world implications in the Myriad
debates. In many ways, however, dynamic governance remains a
maturing concept in patent law. Indeed, implementing the concept of
dynamic patent governance will raise significant challenges in the
system governing patent law. First, dynamic patent governance
challenges the impulse to centralize patent administration and litigation
so as to create largely uniform systems of law. Second, a dynamic
patent governance environment may risk exacerbating administrative
inefficiencies within the patent system.
A. Dynamic Patent Governance and the Question of Centralization
and Diversity in Patent Law
The emergence of dynamic patent governance as a model seems to
complicate a key concern of institutional design in administrative patent
law: whether to centralize the judicial and administrative functions of
the patent system. The United States’ successful concentration of
centralized appellate review in the Federal Circuit has prompted
consideration, in the European Union, of specialized community-wide
162
163

Id. at S9.
On July 2, 2010, Advocate General Juliane Kokott provided an opinion advising the Court
of Justice to find that, in its current draft, the proposed agreement is incompatible with EU treaty
obligations. C-01/09 [Op. of Advocate Gen.], Avis au titre de l’art. 300, CE – Relations
Exterieures at para. 6 (July 2, 2010). On March 8, 2011, the Court of Justice issued an opinion
that largely agreed with the Advocate General’s position. Opinion 01/09 of the Court, EUR. CT.
OF JUSTICE. (Mar. 8, 2011), available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/ (type “08/03/2011”
in the “from” bar; then click on “Avis 1/09” hyperlink).
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trial and appellate level patent review. 164 Likewise, as heterogeneity
has blossomed within the context of the administrative function of the
patent system, centralization has also developed as an alternative to the
potential problem of a “heterogeneity thicket.” In both cases,
proponents of centralization claim it brings a perceived uniformity in
application of patentability standards, and therefore more clearly
defined intellectual property rights.
How then does the proposed model respond to the current impulse
for centralized governance within patent law? We make two claims.
First, we think that fluidity between the informal and formal dimensions
of patent law may have the unintended consequence of generating
alternative forums for review of issued patents and related policy
questions. Second, a model based on dynamic patent governance
suggests that, in the institutional design of the patent system, it might be
helpful to perceive centralization and diversity as a continuum of design
choices, rather than an either/or dichotomy.
1. The Challenge of Centralization and “Unintended” Alternative
Forums
Recently, the usefulness of centralized patent appellate review in
the United States, (which has served as a model for the proposed
centralization of external review within Europe and other patent
systems), has been criticized. John Duffy and Craig Nard 165 advocate
for a “polycentric” decision-making model, with the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit joined by a second appellate circuit. Such
polycentric decision-making would be beneficial, according to Duffy
and Nard, because it would create doctrinal competition in articulating
jurisprudential standards and encourage more innovative jurisprudence
to resolve difficult doctrinal issues of claim construction. 166 This has
prompted written responses from scholars such as Judge Lee Plager and
Lynne Pettigrew, 167 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss 168 and Lee
164 Progress Report Enhancing the Patent System in Europe, Doc. No. 14970/08 (2008),
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st15/st15674.en08.pdf.
165 Duffy & Nard, supra note 50, at 1623.
166 Id. at 1626-27.
167 Plager and Pettigrew contend that Duffy and Nard’s polycentric decision-making
incorrectly predicts that more polycentric decision-making will produce “better” decisions and
moreover, disagree with Duffy and Nard’s overall contention that judicial decisions, are a vehicle
for policy directives. S. Jay Plager & Lynne E. Pettigrew, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity
Principle: A Response to Nard and Duffy, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1735, 1739 (2007).
168 Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of
Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 823 (2008) (suggesting that incremental changes, rather than
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Petherbridge, 169 offering defenses of centralization within patent
governance.
The debate over uniformity within appellate policy determinations
often depends on an either/or dichotomy. Either a singular appellate
court exists that makes determinations related to patent law, or a dual
appellate court (in the Duffy/Nard formulation) is an ideal position to
undertake such decision-making. In a dynamic environment, however,
it is possible to see already existent alternative appellate avenues in
which different perspectives on patent law can be addressed.
A current example is the ability of pre-existing alternative
appellate review within those cases that fall at the intersection of patent
and antitrust pleadings. For example, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, in In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation
(In re DDAVP), recently addressed the “novel question of standing that
lies at the junction of antitrust and patent law.” 170 In re DDAVP
involved the efforts of a class of direct purchasers of the anti-diuretic
DDAVP who argued that the defendants violated Section Two of the
Sherman Antitrust Act. Specifically, the direct purchasers alleged that
the defendants engaged in an exclusionary scheme under Section Two:
(1) to procure the DDAVP patent by engaging in inequitable conduct;
(2) to improperly list the fraudulently obtained patent in the FDA’s
Orange Book, thereby enabling patent infringement claims against
potential infringement by competitors; (3) to prosecute sham
infringement litigation against generic competitors; and (4) to file a
sham citizen petition to further delay the FDA’s Approval of Barr’s
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA). 171
The Second Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over the appeals.
While three of the allegations did involve substantial questions of
patentability, the fourth, which focused on the filing of a potential sham
citizen petition at the FDA, supported a patent-independent theory of
liability. 172 The Court addressed whether the plaintiffs, as direct
purchasers, rather than direct competitors, had standing to raise a
Walker Process claim. 173 The defendants contended that Walker
disruptive ones such as those suggested by Duffy and Nard, are needed to resolve the issues
raised by a “maturing” centralized court).
169 Lee Petherbridge, Patent Law Uniformity?, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 421 (2009) (contending
that an empirical analysis demonstrates significant doctrinal diversity in appellate decisionmaking within the Federal Circuit).
170 In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, 585 F.3d 677, 682 (2d Cir. 2009).
171 Id. at 683.
172 Id. at 686-87.
173 Id. at 688. In Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S.
172 (1965), the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could base a claim of antitrust injury on the
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Process standing existed only if the party also had standing to challenge
the patent’s validity. 174 The defendants position would have limited
standing based on direct purchases within this context because patent
law generally reserves standing to those parties that are direct
competitors. 175 The Second Circuit, reluctant to determine whether, as
a per se matter, direct purchasers had a right to raise a Walker Process
claim in every case, determined that it was appropriate in this case for
plaintiffs to have standing in order to challenge an already “tarnished
patent.” 176 The Second Circuit ultimately held that plaintiffs had
adequately stated an antitrust claim on which relief could be granted. 177
While the standing and jurisdictional issues central to the Second
Circuit’s opinion in In re DDAVP are likely to the be unique to the
administrative law jurisprudence of the United States, the Second
Circuit’s decision has resulted in the emergence of an alternative “node”
within the patent governance network for review of patent-related
competition issues. Such an alternative avenue of competition is also
available in the European Union, as demonstrated by the General
Court’s recent opinion in AstraZeneca v. European Commission
(AstraZeneca). 178 AstraZeneca, like In re DDAVP, is a case that is to a
certain extent out of place in that, since no centralized EU patent exists,
the courts of the European Union, sitting in Luxembourg, do not
normally address patent-related issues. Nonetheless, once patents
and/or supplementary protection certificates 179 are granted, the courts of
the European Union can invoke competition law to define the
boundaries of the patent owner’s rights.
In AstraZeneca, the General Court upheld the decision of the
European Commission, which had imposed a fine of € 60 million on
AstraZeneca for abusing its dominant position by using the patent
system and associated procedures to market pharmaceutical products
patentee’s fraudulent behavior within the context of the acquisition of a patent.
174 In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, 585 F.3d at 684.
175 Kali N. Murray, Rules for Radicals: A Politics of Patent Law, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 63,
77-80 (analyzing standing of direct competitors in the post-issuance context).
176 In re DDAVP, 587 F.3d at 691.
177 Murray, supra note 175, at 77-80.
178 Case T-321/05, AstraZeneca v. Euro. Comm’n, unreported July 1, 2010, available at
http://curia.europa.eu (to search for this case, follow the “en” hyperlink; then type “T-321/05” in
the “Case No” field and click “Search”; then follow “T-321/05” hyperlink where the date “201007-01” is listed).
179 In the EU, supplementary protection certificates operate as a sui generis extension of a
patent that is available for medicinal products and plant protection products. They were
introduced to compensate for the long time required to obtain authorization to put these products
on the market. See Council Regulation 1768/92 of 18 June 1992 Concerning the Creation of a
Supplementary Protection Certificate for Medicinal Products, 1992 O.J. (L 182) 1.
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with the sole purpose of preventing or delaying the market entry of
competitors to Losec (their anti-ulcer product), while also preventing
According to the Commission,
parallel imports of Losec. 180
AstraZeneca had made deliberately misleading representations to the
patent offices of Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom so as to obtain supplementary
protection certificates for Losec that conferred extended patent
protection. 181 Moreover, the Commission sanctioned AstraZeneca for
having de-registered the Losec capsule marketing authorizations in
Denmark, Norway and Sweden so as to (1) delay and make more
difficult the marketing of generic medicinal products and (2) prevent
parallel imports of Losec. 182 This was contrary to the then existing law
that required that the marketing authorization of the original product to
be in force in the Member State concerned in order to qualify for a
simplified procedure. 183 According to the Commission, AstraZeneca’s
deregistration of the Losec capsule’s marketing authorizations had the
effect of preventing the use of the simplified procedure. This in turn
made getting marketing authorizations for generic medicinal products
more time-consuming and difficult, thereby delaying the entry of
The General Court rejected most of
generic competitors. 184
AstraZeneca’s arguments for annulment of the Commission’s decision
and held that the company had abused its dominant position, even
though the Commission failed to prove part of its second contention. 185
Unlike the Second Circuit’s holding in In re DDAVP, under EU
law the General Court did not have constrained jurisdictional authority
since the Commission had imposed a fine on AstraZeneca as an exercise
of its powers under Article 102 of the TFEU. This was a sufficient
ground for the Court to claim jurisdiction under Article 263 of the
TFEU. In this respect, AstraZeneca is not an exact parallel to In re
DDAVP. Nonetheless, the General Court’s holding in AstraZeneca
illustrates that even in an utterly complex heterogeneity thicket, such as
the European patent governance system, unintended formal actors are
increasingly more willing to engage in review of patent-related issues.
Technically, the courts of the European Union cannot exercise
jurisdiction over claims involving patents granted by the EPO or
180
181
182
183
184

AstraZeneca, supra note 178 ¶¶ 612–13, 864.
Id. ¶ 305.
Id. ¶ 871
Id. ¶¶ 806, 808.
Commission Decision of 15 June 2005 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC
Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement, 2006 O.J. (L 332) 24.
185 Id.
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national patent offices. However, in AstraZeneca, the General Court
exercised its ability to review acts of the European Commission
intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties, such as
competition decisions (acting as an expertise actor within the
competition law context), and placed significant limits on the behavior
of patent owners.
The Second Circuit’s holding in In re DDAVP and the General
Court’s decision in Astra-Zeneca reflect what role centralization and
diversity will likely play in judicial decision-making within a dynamic
patent governance environment. First, both cases demonstrate that
diversity of judicial decision-making and restraints on patent holder’s
behavior can occur at different nodes within the governance system
without formal, statutory changes in the law. Second, In re DDAVP, in
particular, demonstrates that the existence of heterogeneous
administrative agencies may prompt new types of challenges within the
context of patent law. The Second Circuit’s reliance on a potentially
sham citizen petition as a basis for an antitrust claim demonstrates the
increasing importance of the FDA as a site for conflict within patent
enforcement. The FDA, because of its review of pharmaceutical
products, has re-shaped the patent landscape by providing
pharmaceutical actors with a stronger incentive to engage in
sophisticated strategies within the administrative context (such as the
choice of whether to list a patent on the FDA’s Orange Book); and the
litigation context (such as increasingly offering incentives to primary
pharmaceutical companies to enter into settlements with generic
companies). 186 Finally, the role of direct purchasers in In re DDAVP
exemplifies the involvement of a more diverse public in patent law; a
patent “civil society” that may come to patent law from other fields
(such as antitrust), or that may have goals that differ from direct
competitors in asserting patent law claims. In re DDAVP’s expansion
of standing to bring certain claims signals the part that broader patent
civil society can play within patent law.
2. The Challenge of Centralization and the “Intended” Continuum of
Institutional Design in Patent Law
The either/or dichotomy of centralization versus decentralization
ignores the present reality of a partially de-centralized specialized
appellate review. In addition, it affects reconsideration of the
186 See generally, Ron A. Bouchard et al., The Pas De Deux of Pharmaceutical Regulation, 24
BERK. L. & TECH. J. 1464, 1494 (2009).
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institutional design of existing primary and secondary actors, as well as
proposals for new patent related actors. Recent patent scholarship has
begun to grapple with, (but not describe), what we identified in Part B
as the heterogeneity thicket; the problem of too many individual actors
seeking to regulate and enforce patents.
The solution to problems within patent governance has often been
to suggest more “centralized” institutional design. For instance, Stuart
Benjamin and Arti Rai 187 recently proposed an Office of Innovation
Policy (OIP) that would review all regulations that impact “innovation”
in the United States. 188 Pursuant to this proposal, any regulations
related to patents, would have to be submitted to the OIP for review.
Such centralized administrative review would be optimal, Benjamin and
Rai contend, because decentralized policy review creates “disinformity,
lack of focus on the regulatory objective, potentially significant
transaction costs for regulated entities subject to a welter of different
regimes, and significant government costs arising from so many
regulators covering significant ground.” 189 The proposed OIP would
serve to centralize decision-making related to innovative policy in two
key respects. 190 First, the OIP would be able to issue ex ante policy
guidelines to agencies that would be used by agencies to identify the
impact of their decision-making on innovation. 191 The agency would be
required to include such an ex ante OIP policy determination in its
administrative record. Any subsequent judicial review would then be
required to undertake searching “hard-look” review to determine
whether or not the agency effectively considered the “innovative”
impact of its decision-making. 192 Second, consideration of OIP
evaluation could be included in the ex post analysis undertaken by the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in its centralized
review of the budgetary impact of a proposed agency regulation. 193
Rai and Benjamin suggest that a future OIP could be instrumental
in helping the executive branch create and integrate a uniform
innovation policy among the various agencies, as well as harmonize the
role of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches in implementing

187 Stuart M. Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 58–59 (2008).
188 Id. at 58.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 58-64 (dicussing the functions of the OIP).
191 Id. at 64.
192 Id. at 65.
193 Id. at 64.
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that policy. 194
Rai and Benjamin acknowledge, however, one
problematic aspect of their proposed OIP, namely, its likely insulation
from public participation and accountability structures under the
Having concluded an
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 195
empirical assessment of the public participation processes at the Federal
Communication Commission (FCC), Benjamin and Rai contend that
these procedures have limited value in improving innovation regulation.
In particular, Benjamin and Rai note that comments were submitted
“disproportionately” by well-organized groups and were often
duplicative during informal rulemaking. 196 Thus, Benjamin and Rai
contend that participation processes within the context of FCC informal
rulemaking are “not essential, or even particularly helpful for the
purposes of improving innovation regulation,” and therefore would not
be necessary for an OIP assessment. 197
While there is much to admire about Benjamin and Rai’s proposal,
and its attempts to address an identified problem in our own model (“the
heterogeneity thicket”), we struggle with the major flaw on which OIP
is premised: the apparent lack of public participation that is
contemplated as part of its design structure.
In particular, we struggle with what centralized review without
public participation would mean in the context of patent law. Benjamin
and Rai offer their critique of basic participation structures based on an
analysis of such processes at the FCC. 198 Such a reference to the FCC’s
policy environment ignores the statutory constraints placed on public
participation within the patent context. The Federal Circuit’s recent
decision in Tafas v. Doll 199 signals that at least some among its bench
would seek to place significant constraints on the ability of the USPTO
to undertake substantive policy review (under Section 553 of the APA).
These constraints on the USPTO’s ability to conduct substantive notice
and comment rulemaking under Section 2 of the Patent Act limit the
ability of the public to participate in the USPTO’s interpretative
determinations of its statutory responsibilities. 200 Substantive policy
194
195

Id. at 56.
An OIP ex ante or ex post review would not likely be considered “notice and comment”
rule-making under Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act. See id. at 75; see also
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006) (outlining requirement for “notice and
comment” rulemaking procedures).
196 Benjamin & Rai, supra note 187, at 73.
197 Id. at 75.
198 Id. at 59-60.
199 559 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated, 328 Fed. App’x. 658 (Fed. Cir. 2009), appeal
dismissed 586 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
200 Kali Murray, First Things, First: A Principled Approach to Patent Administrative Law, 42
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review is further constrained by limits on the ability of third parties,
beyond a potentially infringing competitor, to raise pre-issuance or postissuance challenges to administrative decisions undertaken by the
USPTO during the re-examination procedure. 201 Moreover, new
experimental tools created by the USPTO, such as the Peer to Patent
Project, the Ombudsman Project, and the Director’s Blog, will not
compensate for these shortcomings.
Strategic re-evaluation
mechanisms such as the EPO’s Scenario’s project and large-scale
consultations like those of the European Commission and the European
Parliament on the future of patent policy also seem absent.
The existence of a “public interest” community that can organize
around the accountability structures at the USPTO or actively challenge
the issuance of administrative rules is, therefore, very limited. Efforts
to further de-legitimize public participation in the patent governance
system by proposing actors that would lack considerable opportunities
for participation may have a deeper and lasting consequence in a
constrained regulatory environment. A lean, centralized, superstructural node, such as the OIP proposed by Benjamin and Rai, can
only serve as an acceptable model if public participation is
appropriately guaranteed at the epistemic community and the civil
society levels.
Rather than emphasizing decentralization or centralization as the
principal solution, we suggest that a model of dynamic patent
governance offers a compromise. A model of dynamic patent
governance recognizes the needs for patent governance to acknowledge
that decentralization and centralization are part of a broader continuum
of design choices within the context of institutional design. So, we see
a need for a transparent network consisting of (1) decentralized formal
actors with appropriate procedures for public participation; and (2)
centralized review at super-structural nodes. In this way, incoherence
and duplication would be prevented by the centralized review
mechanism, while at the same time access to expert advice from
epistemic communities and from the patent civil society would be
guaranteed at the decentralized level. A centralized, super-structural
node, such as Benjamin and Rai’s OIP—with ex ante and ex post
powers to review policies related to innovation, including patent
policy—would fit comfortably within a concept of dynamic patent
governance that includes a variety of heterogeneous actors collaborating
within a dynamic patent governance network. Such an integrated
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 29, 61-62 (2008).
201 Murray, supra note 175, at 77-85.
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approach would not only be useful for the United States, but also for
Europe, which is currently contemplating its first comprehensive
Innovation Strategy. 202
B. Dynamic Patent Governance and the Challenge of Efficiency
The other primary criticism of our model is that its obvious
complexity would prompt even more administrative inefficiencies in
patent governance.
We argue, however, that dynamic patent
governance may offer more, rather than less, administrative efficiency
in patent offices.
The Trilateral Cooperation framework 203 between the USPTO, the
EPO and the JPO offers an example of how to increase efficiency by
exploiting the strengths of a governance network in a number of ways.
First, the USPTO, the EPO and the JPO extended the existing sets of
bilateral Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH) work-sharing agreements
to a “fast-track” patent examination procedure for PCT applications
under the pilot PCT-Patent Prosecution Highway (PCT-PPH) Program.
PCT applications that receive a positive written opinion from either the
International Searching Authority or the International Preliminary
Examining Authority, or an international preliminary examination
report from EPO, JPO or USPTO are subject to an expedited
examination. 204 Second, these patent offices have engaged in the Triway Pilot Program, which expedites a search in each office, if the patent
applicant has filed with either the EPO, JPO or USPTO as its office of
first filing under the Paris Convention. 205 The Trilateral Cooperation
framework provides a successful example of three patent offices coming
together to expedite examination of the respective applications. This
practical solution to expediting applications may also herald an
increased consistency in the legal standards of each regime. This
increased consistency is also reflected in the third major collaborative

202 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Europe 2020
Flagship Initiative, Innovation Union, COM (2010) 546 final (Oct. 6, 2010), http://ec.europa.eu/
commission_2010-2014/geoghegan-quinn/headlines/documents/com-2010-546-final_en.pdf.
203 See generally History, THE TRILATERAL CO-OPERATION, available at http://www.trilateral
.net/index.html;jsessionid=j5wskyqrynla (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
204 Pilot of Patent Prosecution Highway Program to use PCT Work Products, PCT
NEWSLETTER, No. 12/2009, at 1; The Trilateral Offices commence PCT-Patent Prosecution
Highway Pilot, PCT NEWSLETTER, No. 02/2010, at 2.
205 Tri-Way Pilot Program Among The United States Patent and Trademark Office, the
European Patent Office, and the Japan Patent Office, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
(Jul. 28, 2008), http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/triwaypilot.html.
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initiative between the three offices: the establishment of the Trilateral
Biotechnology Working Group—whose mission is to faciliate similar
practices in evolving areas of technology and patent law, with the
ultimate goal of harmonization of practice among the Trilateral
partners. 206
Super-structural nodes, such as national patent offices
collaborating within the Trilateral Cooperation framework, may also
raise some concerns despite the opportunities they present.
Preliminarily, the patent offices, while collaborating within a
superstructural node, must still ensure that they are operating pursuant
to domestic administrative authority. For instance, while the USPTO
has entered into expedited search agreements based on its authority to
govern the proceedings of its office under 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2), 207 its
authority to join international treaties under the same section remains
advisory. 208 Furthermore, these practices may insulate administrators
from democratic accountability procedures, such as notice and comment
rulemaking, or intensive consultation procedures that are open to a
wider range of public interest groups.
The aforementioned concerns are not so dominant when it comes
to establishing practical procedures aimed at expediting patent grants
and limiting backlogs. However, for substantive policymaking projects
these concerns appear more urgent. Therefore, it is vital to emphasize
that despite collaboration at the level of an international super-structural
node, the three patent offices/nodes that are part of the Trilateral
Cooperation framework remain individually responsible for providing
appropriate mechanisms for accountability within their own legal
systems. Dynamic patent governance thus serves efficiency aims by
facilitating and enabling collaboration by building super-structural
nodes that fulfill new functions, while maintaining stable accountability
mechanisms for legitimate policy-making within each individual node.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our proposed model seeks to refine early attempts by experts such
as Francis Gurry and James Boyle to suggest a patent governance model
with global significance. However, our proposed model still remains
provisional, tentative, even. For, as the Myriad debates demonstrate,
“events on the ground” are driving whether our proposed model will
206 See Biotechnology, THE TRILATERAL CO-OPERATION, available at http://www.trilateral.net
/projects/biotechnology.html (last visited Apr. 2011).
207 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) (2010).
208 Id. § 2(b)(8).
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become a fully developed one.
Our model requires further development of its potential
consequences and challenges. The impact of a more dynamic system of
patent governance—in particular on doctrinal development—still
remains uncertain. Subjects so long at the core of patent law—such as
the nature of invention and what are the best legal devices to protect any
given invention—may shift in response to interdisciplinary concerns in
other fields. Concerns in other fields can range from public health
concerns over access to drugs and genetic testing; to the relationships of
patents to food, health and safety; to the role of patent law within the
context of competition policy. At this stage in the development of our
model, more questions than answers exist.
Yet, we think that articulating our model, even at this stage, has
some useful outcomes. First, patent reform efforts at the legislative and
administrative nodes may valuably benefit from conscious application
of this model in a number of respects. Policy-making instruments used
on opposite sides of the Atlantic may inspire reform at the legislative
and administrative nodes. For instance, the USPTO could usefully
adopt the “scenarios model” undertaken by the EPO as a way to foster a
long-term vision for its changing role. Congress could consider some
more informal consultation procedures—beyond carefully staged
testimony—where a broader spectrum of stakeholders is represented.
The EPO could become more transparent by having an equivalent to
peer to patent review and the Ombudsman Pilot Program.
Second, we think that our model suggests that the institutional
design of patent law needs to be effectively mediated between
centralization and decentralization in the examiner and review nodes.
In particular, institutional design needs to reflect the demands for
increased participation of patent stakeholders (the epistemic community
and the patent civil society alike) while safeguarding the need for
efficient administrative governance.
Finally, our model implies that the role of the informal dimension
is a central element in patent governance. The Myriad patent debates
suggest that a wider audience is paying attention to patent governance,
and patent administrators, by utilizing our model, can respond to the
“voices” knocking at the door.
So, this is not so much a conclusion, but an invitation to reflect
further on an evolving patent landscape.
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